The Kagan nomination hearings have begun and while much of the media attention has focused on the politics of the hearings (while acknowledging that her confirmation is a foregone conclusion)--her stance on banning military recruitment while at Harvard or her comments regarding what a farce these hearings are in the first place--and very little on her views about presidential power. In fact, for Democrats--who got so agitated over the issue of presidential power in the Bush administration, they really should be concerned about Kagan's views on the issue of separation of powers and presidential influence of the regulatory process because she will join Alito, Scalia, Robert, and Thomas as a fifth justice in favor of a powerful, unitary executive. How do we know this?
In fact, her views are clearly laid out in her 2001 Harvard Law Review article, "Presidential Administration." The problem is legal scholars, members of the press, members of Congress, and analysts for the Congressional Research Service do not see her views for what they are--Unitarian. The last one is particularly troubling since it is supposed to clarify issues for Congress in the not for public consumption reports it issues on behalf of congresspersons.
The Congressional Research Service issues reports to members of Congress--at taxpayers expense--but will not make them available to the public. Fortunately groups like the Federation of American Scientists archive these reports and make them available for free to anyone with Internet access. In this particular report, CRS analyst Todd Tatelman takes on the issue of presidential power and Kagan's views a la "Presidential Administration." In the end, he confuses and misinforms.
First, and I may be a bit biased in this account, he does not refer to any work by a political scientist when he discusses either presidential power theories or the unitary executive theory in particular. Second, his overview of the unitary executive theory isn't right, which largely comes from a failure to review the literature on the unitary executive. And finally, he accepted at face value Kagan's thesis that the Clinton administration's approach to rulemaking was anti-unitarian.
First, because he does not consult political scientists--and since he himself is trained as a legal scholar--he doesn't have any ideal on the major theories of presidential power. In fact, he reduces--much the way Kagan did--presidential power theories into three camps--the "traditionalists," the "unitarians," and then Kagan's "administration." The traditionalists are nothing more than Howard Taft's "Stewardship" theory of power, where the president is left to carrying out the specific powers granted to him by Article II and nothing more. This theory was influential among academics through much of the 20th century. But its influence came to an end in 1960, with the publication of Presidential Power. Neustadt's theory, which still dominates the thinking of presidency scholars in political science and history, argued that the constitutional powers are not as important as what the individual brings to the office. There, the presidency succeeds and fails on the shoulders of the man behind the desk. His credibility, his reputation, his ability to influence others to do what he wants to get done is how the presidency works. Those needing persuading include the Congress, the press, interest groups, the American public, foreign leaders--everyone and anyone. Thus this view of power, to no surprise, places the president at the center of the political system. Ask any individual in America today who the most important political leader is, and they will tell you it is the president. The media certainly believe it in the sheer volume of coverage devoted to the man and the institution. The flaw in the theory, of course, is its focus on the individual in the Oval Office and not to the institution, that gets built by the contributions of those who came before.
So in Tatelman's introductory discussion of theories of power, he overlooks the "Grand Canyon" simply because he didn't know it was there.
Second, he fails to provide an accurate description of the tenets of the unitary executive theory--something that also likely happened because of his failure to adequately review the literature. As Tatelman argues, unitarians "ascribe to a view of presidential authority that has three prongs: First, unitarians often argue that the President has a constitutionally based duty to provide policy direction to officers of the United States; second, unitarians claim that the President possesses the unfettered power to remove from office any officer who does not comply with the President's policy directive; and finally, unitarians generally assert that Congress cannot constitutionally assign executive powers to agencies or other entities that are independent or outside the scope of the President's control."
OK, to the layperson, this may seem obtuse, but if you read it carefully, you may be scratching your head that each of the three prongs were pretty much the same. How can a paradigm of presidential power not differentiate its tenets? If he would have looked at my dissertation, for instance, he would have found my distillation of the three tenets of the theory taken from a review of the literature from legal scholars who built it in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As I argued, the three tenets are as follows: First, the president has the prerogative to remove subordinate officials without interference from Congress. While Congress (specifically the Senate) may have a say in who gets confirmed, they do not get to interfere in who gets fired. In fact, the only potential check on this first tenet comes from the politics of the moment and the president's standing with the public. For example, from a constitutional standpoint, President Bush was in his right to fire the federal prosecutors after the 2004 election. The politics of the moment, however, made the firing a disaster to his ability to govern, and in the end reduced the President's standing with the public and with members of his own Party. Second, the president--along with the vice-president--is the only elected individuals in the Executive Branch. As such, they are politically accountable for the decisions made by the bureaucrats. Thus unitarians believe that it is the president's prerogative to control the execution of discretionary decision making. Since the Constitution "vests" to the president the "executive power," it is his--and not a bureaucrats--right to a final say. The vesting clause is also something I wish to address below, because Tatelman completely missed the point of its importance to unitarians. And finally, third, the "Oath clause" of the Constitution commands the president to protect and defend not just his Office but also the Constitution of the United States. This means he is bound by oath to refuse enforcement of anything he believes is unconstitutional. In Tatelman's discussion of the important clauses of Article II to unitarians, he mentions the "Vesting" clause and the "Take Care" clause, but not the "Oath" clause. Now of course the Constitution gives the president weapons like the veto to do just this, but because the Constitution vests all the executive power to the president, it means that he is afforded tools not specifically mentioned by the Constitution--tools such as the signing statement. The signing statement gives the president the option to "save" an important piece of legislation by refusing defense or enforcement of a provision that violates the Constitution. Take my favorite example--FDR is given an important military spending bill during WWII, but the bill contains a provision that places guilt upon employees of the State Department--a so-called "bill of attainder." Since it is an important spending bill, FDR is boxed into a difficult position--does he veto it and perhaps place the free World in jeopardy, or does he enforce it but hold off on the provision throwing the State Department employees in jail? He did the latter, and the Supreme Court stood by him.
The unitarians place a great deal of importance on three clauses of Article II, as mentioned above. The "Oath" clause, which I just discussed. Second is the "Take Care" clause, which requires the president to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed." This is important because it gives the president the constitutional authority to oversee the manner in which any executive officer executes the law--including those we call the "Independents"--members of the independent regulatory agencies and commissions such as the FCC or the SEC. And then finally there is the "Vesting" clause. Tatelman, as noted above, totally misreads why unitarians think this clause--which can be found in each of the first three Articles of the Constitution--is so important. He writes that the clause is "best read and most properly understood to be a general grant of power to the President. Focusing on the language "shall be vested," unitarians believe that this construction, identical to the construction used to grant judicial power to Article III courts, creates a single and exclusive executive actor, namely, the President. (emphasis mine)" But they are not identical, which is why unitarians find it so important. If you look to the "Vesting" clause of Article I, it says that the "legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress..." In Article III, it says that the "judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Now in Article II is simply says that the "executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States." See the difference? In Article I, it limits the legislative power to those provisions laid out specifically and deliberately in Article I. In Article III, it dilutes the judicial power by dividing it between the Supreme Court and the inferior courts created by the Congress. But the president has ALL the executive power, which for unitarians means those powers specified in Article II and those executive powers outside, including those called "prerogative powers." Had Tatelman done a careful reading of the literature on the unitary executive, this point would have hit him like a heavy object. But since he missed it so badly, at least for me, it threw the rest of the analysis into doubt, and for good reason.
Finally, there is his reading of Kagan's thesis and his willingness to believe that she articulates a theory distinct from the unitary executive theory. Tatelman believes Kagan that Clinton exercised a different kind of influence over the bureaucracy than his Republican predecessors, which makes him un-unitarian.
In my dissertation, I walk the reader through the institutionalization of presidential influence over rulemaking that started with the Reagan administration and continued through the Clinton administration, and how it tied to the unitary executive theory. I will summarize that here and explain where Tatelman's analysis falters. The Reagan administration used two important executive orders (12,291 and 12,468) to gain influence over the bureaucracy by centralizing rulemaking oversight inside the OMB (the eyes and ears of the White House inside the bureaucracy) and by forcing agencies to submit their yearly regulatory agendas for (tacit) approval or disapproval by the White House. The Bush I administration continued with this process by empowering the vice president with a central role in controlling regulations. It was the intent of the Reagan and Bush I administrations to control the bureaucracy in an effort to throttle regulations that were deemed harmful to business or other important constituencies. Thus there influence was a negative influence. When the Clinton administration came to office, its rhetoric was about transparency in the regulatory process, but in practice it continued with its predecessors in exercising a high degree of influence within the bureaucracy. Clinton issued Executive Order 12, 866, which simply combined the Reagan orders and added, as a bonus, the requirement that the independent regulatory agencies and commissions submit their yearly regulatory agendas to the OMB (actually, to OIRA within OMB). Clinton did this while the Democrats controlled the Congress, so there was little to no reaction to the new order. When the Democrats lost control of the Congress in 1994, Clinton used the bureaucracy to "end-run" the Congress--to get things done administratively that he could not get done legislatively. This prompted the famous Begala quote, "Stroke of the Pen, Law of the Land. Kinda Cool." Kagan wrote of this authority: "When Congress delegates discretionary authority to an agency official, because that official is a subordinate of the President, it is so granting discretionary authority (unless otherwise specified) to the President." This is ripped right from the pages of unitarians--the president of the US has the authority to check the actions of bureaucrats as the top political person in the Executive Branch. Just because the president seeks to exercise positive influence over the bureaucracy, as Clinton did, does not make him different from his Republican, unitarian predecessors. The difference is one of degree, and not kind.
Thus to conclude, as I sit and watch the Senators with their opening remarks, I have heard no concern with the nominees views on presidential power. This was front and center just four years ago when the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the nomination of judge Samuel Alito, and it should be front and center today with nominee Elena Kagan.
Monday, June 28, 2010
Friday, June 04, 2010
Document Dump!
For those who want to peek behind the curtain of the White House--to see how decisions get made--then there is no better time than when a President releases records from his administration. Five years ago the Reagan Library released the Alito memos, which detailed the strategy to create the signing statement, among other things.
Now that President Obama has nominated Solicitor General Elena Kagan to take over the Supreme Court seat vacated by retiring Justice Stevens, and since Kagan previously worked as a domestic policy adviser in the Clinton administration, the Clinton Library has dumped a number of her memos which are fascinating. So if the "tic toc" of politics is your thing, then you have to visit these documents and read through them.
Now that President Obama has nominated Solicitor General Elena Kagan to take over the Supreme Court seat vacated by retiring Justice Stevens, and since Kagan previously worked as a domestic policy adviser in the Clinton administration, the Clinton Library has dumped a number of her memos which are fascinating. So if the "tic toc" of politics is your thing, then you have to visit these documents and read through them.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
More On Missouri
The good folks working for Missouri Senator Jason Crowell (R) have shared with me a letter they sent to Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster (D) imploring him to move forward with judicial action to over turn a recent signing statement challenging a provision of a bill dealing with funding to elementary and secondary education in the State.
Senator Crowell makes a number of arguments to bolster his case:
Crowell concludes:
With this said, in my opinion, a constitutional issue as to the validity of section 14.005 may exist but that constitutional issue is solely a matter for the judiciary of the State to determine, not the Executive. After careful review of the unprecedented actions of Governor Nixon, I respectfully request you to use any and all legal powers to ensure that the separation of powers found in Missouri's Constitution are protected as quickly as legally possible.
First the challenges. The second challenge about the executive branch being unable to disregard the law does not apply here since we are talking about the governor, and not an inferior executive branch officer. The other challenges hinge on whether the governor is really bound by three choices--sign a bill, veto a bill, or item veto appropriations bills? Here I would suggest a look into the actions of previous governors because, just like George W. Bush, the signing statement that got all the attention was hardly the first one ever used. My bet is that Governor Nixon's signing statement is not the first signing statement challenge issued by a Missouri governor. Thus going into the courtroom, the legislature would have to tell a judge why this one is unconstitutional and not the previous ones. This was the strategy of the Reagan administration--to use the signing statement on bills that were not likely to draw much attention so that when they were used on a bill with a high public profile, the administration could point to all those that had been used without a ruckus by the Congress or anyone else.
There is also the question of standing, which has been key with the presidential signing statement and the focus on this book by Christopher May. May argued that one big problem with a president defying the will of the legislature is a lack of standing to sue. The courts cannot get involved proactively, but instead must wait until a suit is brought to the courts. And a suit may only come to the courts if the parties have standing to sue. For Senator Crowell, he cannot sue on behalf of the Congress, but instead must get Congress to authorize a suit. Even though the MO. legislature is controlled by the Republicans, it is still a tall order to get the entire Congress on board.
Instead, the better hope for a judicial outcome would be to get some of the school districts to sue. The Powers Report makes the case that 151 MO. school districts will be negatively impacted by the challenge, and anyone of them, or all, will have standing to sue. In that case, Senator Crowell could provide an amicus brief challenging the governor's action.
I guess we next wait for the attorney general's response, though I think we all know what he is going to say.
Senator Crowell makes a number of arguments to bolster his case:
- The Governor has exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued the challenge: The Missouri Constitution only allows the governor, when presented with a bill one of three options--sign it, veto the whole bill, or line item veto bills dealing with appropriations;
- The executive branch cannot declare a law unconstitutional: Senator Crowell cites a MO. court opinion where the attorney general issued an opinion challenging the constitutionality of a provision of law. The court found that the attorney general did not have the constitutional authority for such an action;
- The governor may not challenge the purpose behind an appropriation: The Governor did not challenge the appropriation but rather challenged the wording of how the money should be spent: The argument here is when the governor is faced with an appropriation bill, he has to strike the provision down, not rewrite it;
Crowell concludes:
With this said, in my opinion, a constitutional issue as to the validity of section 14.005 may exist but that constitutional issue is solely a matter for the judiciary of the State to determine, not the Executive. After careful review of the unprecedented actions of Governor Nixon, I respectfully request you to use any and all legal powers to ensure that the separation of powers found in Missouri's Constitution are protected as quickly as legally possible.
First the challenges. The second challenge about the executive branch being unable to disregard the law does not apply here since we are talking about the governor, and not an inferior executive branch officer. The other challenges hinge on whether the governor is really bound by three choices--sign a bill, veto a bill, or item veto appropriations bills? Here I would suggest a look into the actions of previous governors because, just like George W. Bush, the signing statement that got all the attention was hardly the first one ever used. My bet is that Governor Nixon's signing statement is not the first signing statement challenge issued by a Missouri governor. Thus going into the courtroom, the legislature would have to tell a judge why this one is unconstitutional and not the previous ones. This was the strategy of the Reagan administration--to use the signing statement on bills that were not likely to draw much attention so that when they were used on a bill with a high public profile, the administration could point to all those that had been used without a ruckus by the Congress or anyone else.
There is also the question of standing, which has been key with the presidential signing statement and the focus on this book by Christopher May. May argued that one big problem with a president defying the will of the legislature is a lack of standing to sue. The courts cannot get involved proactively, but instead must wait until a suit is brought to the courts. And a suit may only come to the courts if the parties have standing to sue. For Senator Crowell, he cannot sue on behalf of the Congress, but instead must get Congress to authorize a suit. Even though the MO. legislature is controlled by the Republicans, it is still a tall order to get the entire Congress on board.
Instead, the better hope for a judicial outcome would be to get some of the school districts to sue. The Powers Report makes the case that 151 MO. school districts will be negatively impacted by the challenge, and anyone of them, or all, will have standing to sue. In that case, Senator Crowell could provide an amicus brief challenging the governor's action.
I guess we next wait for the attorney general's response, though I think we all know what he is going to say.
Thursday, May 06, 2010
Return of the Signing Statement
But not what you think.
There is a separation of powers battle going on right now in Missouri, and the signing statement is right at the center of it. If you are confused, then let me explain.
It is my belief that the current use of the signing statement was largely influenced by chief executives at the state level, and not the federal level. When the Reagan administration was defending its use of the signing statement back in the 1980s, they pointed to actions of governors, who had used the signing statement frequently to challenge defective provisions of law--much the way that presidents have pointed to the use of the line item veto by state governors to underscore why we should not be worried about the president having the same ability. I had filed this fact away when I was working on my dissertation as something that I should return to down the line--how many, how often, and how long have governors been using the signing statement to correct defective provisions of law? And so I have found bits and pieces of evidence where it has been used--for example, former Governor of Kansas turned current Secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius frequently used the signing statement to do battle with the Kansas State Legislature (such as this example of what I call a rhetorical signing statement).
And this brings me back to the beginning. Last month, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon (D) used a constitutional signing statement (.pdf) to challenge an education appropriations bill. Nixon wrote in the final paragraph of the statement:
There it is--plain and to the point. The legislature so far has been fumbling as to the appropriate course of action--sue using their own attorney, or "...ask Attorney General Chris Koster to do so." Never fear, the attorney general is here.
Senator Jason Crowell (R) of the Missouri legislature has asked Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster (D) to look into the action to determine its legality. Crowell argued that the "...governor has no authority to interpret the constitutionality of legislation passed by lawmakers--he can merely approve it, veto it or, in the case of budget bills, veto specific line items...the signing statement...is violating the separation of powers and...sparking a 'constitutional crisis.'"
No word yet out of AG Koster's office on what he will do. My guess is that Senator Crowell isn't so concerned with the signing statement, but instead the politics of the AG's decision. Force the AG to decide between the constitutional place of the signing statement or his boss as the head of the ticket. I am willing to bet that previous Governors of Missouri have used the signing statement to challenge provisions of law--and Nixon, who once served as Missouri's AG, probably knows this. But since the signing statement is so obscure (Crowell admitted to not understanding precisely what it was himself), the legislative Republicans will have an easier time framing its use in terms of tyranny. Thus in this AP article, one MO. Senate Republican called it "Tyranny" while another claimed it as "an unprecedented power grab." Heck, it worked wonders for congressional Democrats back in 2006 when George W. Bush was under the spotlight for his use of the signing statement, so why not now?
Stay tuned...
There is a separation of powers battle going on right now in Missouri, and the signing statement is right at the center of it. If you are confused, then let me explain.
It is my belief that the current use of the signing statement was largely influenced by chief executives at the state level, and not the federal level. When the Reagan administration was defending its use of the signing statement back in the 1980s, they pointed to actions of governors, who had used the signing statement frequently to challenge defective provisions of law--much the way that presidents have pointed to the use of the line item veto by state governors to underscore why we should not be worried about the president having the same ability. I had filed this fact away when I was working on my dissertation as something that I should return to down the line--how many, how often, and how long have governors been using the signing statement to correct defective provisions of law? And so I have found bits and pieces of evidence where it has been used--for example, former Governor of Kansas turned current Secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius frequently used the signing statement to do battle with the Kansas State Legislature (such as this example of what I call a rhetorical signing statement).
And this brings me back to the beginning. Last month, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon (D) used a constitutional signing statement (.pdf) to challenge an education appropriations bill. Nixon wrote in the final paragraph of the statement:
The Language in Section 14.005, purporting to deviate from current law, is legal surplusage and beyond the constitutional authority of the General Assembly. Therefore, consistent with the requirements of Article IX, Section 3(a), and in recognition of the limitations imposed by Article III, Section 23, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education shall distribute the funds appropriated under Section 14.005 of Senate Committee Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 2014 consistent with existing law.
There it is--plain and to the point. The legislature so far has been fumbling as to the appropriate course of action--sue using their own attorney, or "...ask Attorney General Chris Koster to do so." Never fear, the attorney general is here.
Senator Jason Crowell (R) of the Missouri legislature has asked Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster (D) to look into the action to determine its legality. Crowell argued that the "...governor has no authority to interpret the constitutionality of legislation passed by lawmakers--he can merely approve it, veto it or, in the case of budget bills, veto specific line items...the signing statement...is violating the separation of powers and...sparking a 'constitutional crisis.'"
No word yet out of AG Koster's office on what he will do. My guess is that Senator Crowell isn't so concerned with the signing statement, but instead the politics of the AG's decision. Force the AG to decide between the constitutional place of the signing statement or his boss as the head of the ticket. I am willing to bet that previous Governors of Missouri have used the signing statement to challenge provisions of law--and Nixon, who once served as Missouri's AG, probably knows this. But since the signing statement is so obscure (Crowell admitted to not understanding precisely what it was himself), the legislative Republicans will have an easier time framing its use in terms of tyranny. Thus in this AP article, one MO. Senate Republican called it "Tyranny" while another claimed it as "an unprecedented power grab." Heck, it worked wonders for congressional Democrats back in 2006 when George W. Bush was under the spotlight for his use of the signing statement, so why not now?
Stay tuned...
Monday, February 15, 2010
Why Is It So Hard To Get It Right?
This book review of Gary Wills's new book on executive power is emblematic of why my attempts to make the unitary executive theory mainstream will probably never happen.
The book, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State, apparently makes the case that the persistence of international crisis (mostly the Cold War) has allowed the modern presidents (since FDR) to centralize massive power within the Oval Office--apparently far greater power than even imagined by Alexander Hamilton, the Godfather of the strong presidency (if you believe revisionist history). I have a great deal to say in a critique, but I would prefer to read the book before I do (however I would love to hear from you if you have read the book and what you think about the argument).
What burns me is the things--the important things--that this reviewer, Jurek Martin, gets wrong. There are the minor things--for instance, Martin notes that the Pentagon Papers were "...published only after the Supreme Court so ordered." That isn't true. The Papers had already begun running in the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times" before the Nixon administration asked for the injunction. Nixon was delighted at how the Papers dimmed the light on Camelot, and was persuaded by Kissinger to put a halt to them because of their damage to elite opinion.
No, what gets me is Martin's characterization of the unitary executive and the signing statement. He writes of the unitary executive:
First, why is support for the theory antithetical to conservatives? Why "ironical"? Second, more to the point, is the definition of the unitary executive--"which basically says that the law is anything that the president says it is." Where in the literature do any scholars, including myself, define the unitary executive this way? As I have noted elsewhere, there are three tenets to the unitary executive: 1) the executive power belongs to the president and the president alone; 2) that the president has an independent right to interpret the Constitution and to determine what actions need be taken in the face of laws that he considers to be unconstitutional; and 3) as the only nationally elected official in the United States, he has a constitutional obligation, via the "Take Care" clause of Article II, to make sure that the laws are faithfully executed. This means that the president has a right to know, if not influence, how inferior executive branch officers behave--how they enforce the law, who they communicate with outside the Executive Branch, etc. Now since the unitary executive theory first came to life, those three tenets have been in place. What in those three tenets suggest that the president may claim the law means what he feels it means? What Martin knows about the unitary executive apparently has come from blog postings.
Then he argues that the unitary executive has "produced a welter of 'signing statements' in which a president says he can disregard, for whatever reason, any section of a duly passed congressional bill he has just, er, signed." First, the signing statement, in all forms, preceded the birth of the unitary executive. Granted, they don't start becoming significant until the Reagan administration, but even so, the unitary executive--as a formal theory--didn't debut until after Reagan left office. So while the two have a lot in common, one thing it doesn't have in common is cause and effect. And then, just like his definition of the unitary executive, his definition of the signing statement is equally as bad--the president can disregard, "for whatever reason"?? I wish Martin would find for me any signing statement--even the more egregious Bush signing statements, that say: "I refuse to enforce Section 111 just because." Then finally Martin says that "Bush the Younger" issued "more then (sic) 1,400 such reservations..." He may have gotten this number from Wills, at which case I am interested in his citation. But 1,400? By my counting, Bush issued less than 1,200. Where the extra 200+ came from is beyond me.
But this is the "Financial Times", which has a readership considerably higher than this blog posting or my research. I am obligated to be precise and accurate, why aren't they?
The book, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State, apparently makes the case that the persistence of international crisis (mostly the Cold War) has allowed the modern presidents (since FDR) to centralize massive power within the Oval Office--apparently far greater power than even imagined by Alexander Hamilton, the Godfather of the strong presidency (if you believe revisionist history). I have a great deal to say in a critique, but I would prefer to read the book before I do (however I would love to hear from you if you have read the book and what you think about the argument).
What burns me is the things--the important things--that this reviewer, Jurek Martin, gets wrong. There are the minor things--for instance, Martin notes that the Pentagon Papers were "...published only after the Supreme Court so ordered." That isn't true. The Papers had already begun running in the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times" before the Nixon administration asked for the injunction. Nixon was delighted at how the Papers dimmed the light on Camelot, and was persuaded by Kissinger to put a halt to them because of their damage to elite opinion.
No, what gets me is Martin's characterization of the unitary executive and the signing statement. He writes of the unitary executive:
But the organic growth of the national security state needed theoreticians and they comprise Wills’s large Hall of Infamy. It was the (ironically conservative) Reagan justice department, under attorney-general Edwin Meese, that developed the theory of the “unitary executive” – which basically says that the law is anything that the president says it is.
First, why is support for the theory antithetical to conservatives? Why "ironical"? Second, more to the point, is the definition of the unitary executive--"which basically says that the law is anything that the president says it is." Where in the literature do any scholars, including myself, define the unitary executive this way? As I have noted elsewhere, there are three tenets to the unitary executive: 1) the executive power belongs to the president and the president alone; 2) that the president has an independent right to interpret the Constitution and to determine what actions need be taken in the face of laws that he considers to be unconstitutional; and 3) as the only nationally elected official in the United States, he has a constitutional obligation, via the "Take Care" clause of Article II, to make sure that the laws are faithfully executed. This means that the president has a right to know, if not influence, how inferior executive branch officers behave--how they enforce the law, who they communicate with outside the Executive Branch, etc. Now since the unitary executive theory first came to life, those three tenets have been in place. What in those three tenets suggest that the president may claim the law means what he feels it means? What Martin knows about the unitary executive apparently has come from blog postings.
Then he argues that the unitary executive has "produced a welter of 'signing statements' in which a president says he can disregard, for whatever reason, any section of a duly passed congressional bill he has just, er, signed." First, the signing statement, in all forms, preceded the birth of the unitary executive. Granted, they don't start becoming significant until the Reagan administration, but even so, the unitary executive--as a formal theory--didn't debut until after Reagan left office. So while the two have a lot in common, one thing it doesn't have in common is cause and effect. And then, just like his definition of the unitary executive, his definition of the signing statement is equally as bad--the president can disregard, "for whatever reason"?? I wish Martin would find for me any signing statement--even the more egregious Bush signing statements, that say: "I refuse to enforce Section 111 just because." Then finally Martin says that "Bush the Younger" issued "more then (sic) 1,400 such reservations..." He may have gotten this number from Wills, at which case I am interested in his citation. But 1,400? By my counting, Bush issued less than 1,200. Where the extra 200+ came from is beyond me.
But this is the "Financial Times", which has a readership considerably higher than this blog posting or my research. I am obligated to be precise and accurate, why aren't they?
Saturday, February 13, 2010
Today's New York Times carries a story about Obama's turn toward unilateralism after a first year that was a mixed bag of success and failure (and an article on presidential power that was not penned by Charlie Savage).
This move is so predictable to anyone who has watched presidential behavior in the last 30 years--in fact, not to toot my horn, but it is something I told reporters last January when asked if Obama would be a different president than President Bush (one was to Pacifica Radio and the other was to Congressional Quarterly). Then I stated that once the dust had settled and the glimmer of the Obama victory faded, his public approval numbers would begin to fall. Further he would find frustration in trying to advance important policy through the Congress--promises he had made on the campaign trail--and with an impending re-election campaign coming--would need to act quickly--thus would turn to the unilateral powers that are now deeply entrenched in the Oval Office.
So here we are, just a little over a year after Obama was sworn into office, and the administration is announcing that it gave Congress its chance to come on board, and Congress failed to act:
"Look, we gave it a shot and Congress just wouldn't give us everything we wanted, so we all need to move on" seems to be the message here. The interesting thing about this is how quick the administration is to move to unilateralism and how flimsy of an excuse it has given--how many presidents in the past would have loved having control of both houses of Congress, including 59 Senators?
With each president since Reagan--bar one--the president moved toward unilateralism for good reason--they were dealing with an opposition that not only controlled one or both houses of Congress but were bitterly partisan. For instance Clinton didn't lurch toward unilateralism until 1995--after the Republicans took the Congress. And the one president who went unilateral right away when given a Congress controlled by fellow partisans? George W. Bush. George W. Bush had unified party control of government and a public approval rating that was sky high, yet behaved as if he was surrounded with a hostile public and Congress.
The problem to me seems to be that Obama hasn't figured out leadership yet. For instance, last year he made the ill-fated decision to allow the Congress to construct two major and controversial policies--health care reform and cap and trade--without the involvement of the White House. And when Congress failed, he now thinks that he can get by without them.
Congress is like that wild horse you often see featured in Disney movies that needs to be broken. The only way you break it is to get on its back and show it who is boss. You don't break a wild horse by putting it in a pen and allowing it to tame itself. Had the Obama administration told Congress from the outset what it wanted--and worked diligently at each step--chances are good that the President would not be in the pickle he currently is.
If he is looking for a history lesson, he should look to Reagan's first term. He gave Congress just a couple of major policies to focus on and he used a carrot/stick approach to getting what he wanted. He did the little things like posing with Members or inviting leaders on the yacht Sequoia for one on one time, and for those who were recalcitrant, he called their major donors or he singled them out for personal attacks--all of which worked. Had Obama taken a similar approach, you might not have 60 or 70 nominees bottled up by one senator--instead, he should have made Senator Shelby of Alabama a day-after-day symbol of Republican obstructionism and not waited until now to do so.
So from a research perspective, I am pleased to see that unilateralism is alive and well.
Yes We Can!
This move is so predictable to anyone who has watched presidential behavior in the last 30 years--in fact, not to toot my horn, but it is something I told reporters last January when asked if Obama would be a different president than President Bush (one was to Pacifica Radio and the other was to Congressional Quarterly). Then I stated that once the dust had settled and the glimmer of the Obama victory faded, his public approval numbers would begin to fall. Further he would find frustration in trying to advance important policy through the Congress--promises he had made on the campaign trail--and with an impending re-election campaign coming--would need to act quickly--thus would turn to the unilateral powers that are now deeply entrenched in the Oval Office.
So here we are, just a little over a year after Obama was sworn into office, and the administration is announcing that it gave Congress its chance to come on board, and Congress failed to act:
Mr. Obama has not given up hope of progress on Capitol Hill, aides said, and has scheduled a session with Republican leaders on health care later this month. But in the aftermath of a special election in Massachusetts that cost Democrats unilateral control of the Senate, the White House is getting ready to act on its own in the face of partisan gridlock heading into the midterm campaign.
"Look, we gave it a shot and Congress just wouldn't give us everything we wanted, so we all need to move on" seems to be the message here. The interesting thing about this is how quick the administration is to move to unilateralism and how flimsy of an excuse it has given--how many presidents in the past would have loved having control of both houses of Congress, including 59 Senators?
With each president since Reagan--bar one--the president moved toward unilateralism for good reason--they were dealing with an opposition that not only controlled one or both houses of Congress but were bitterly partisan. For instance Clinton didn't lurch toward unilateralism until 1995--after the Republicans took the Congress. And the one president who went unilateral right away when given a Congress controlled by fellow partisans? George W. Bush. George W. Bush had unified party control of government and a public approval rating that was sky high, yet behaved as if he was surrounded with a hostile public and Congress.
The problem to me seems to be that Obama hasn't figured out leadership yet. For instance, last year he made the ill-fated decision to allow the Congress to construct two major and controversial policies--health care reform and cap and trade--without the involvement of the White House. And when Congress failed, he now thinks that he can get by without them.
Congress is like that wild horse you often see featured in Disney movies that needs to be broken. The only way you break it is to get on its back and show it who is boss. You don't break a wild horse by putting it in a pen and allowing it to tame itself. Had the Obama administration told Congress from the outset what it wanted--and worked diligently at each step--chances are good that the President would not be in the pickle he currently is.
If he is looking for a history lesson, he should look to Reagan's first term. He gave Congress just a couple of major policies to focus on and he used a carrot/stick approach to getting what he wanted. He did the little things like posing with Members or inviting leaders on the yacht Sequoia for one on one time, and for those who were recalcitrant, he called their major donors or he singled them out for personal attacks--all of which worked. Had Obama taken a similar approach, you might not have 60 or 70 nominees bottled up by one senator--instead, he should have made Senator Shelby of Alabama a day-after-day symbol of Republican obstructionism and not waited until now to do so.
So from a research perspective, I am pleased to see that unilateralism is alive and well.
Yes We Can!
Saturday, January 16, 2010
There is a lot of flak the Obama administration is getting lately, some of it deserved, some of it not. And it certainly will only get worse as the November midterms draw near. A case of the hypocrisy in the flak appeared in yesterday's Wall Street Journal's OpEd page. Imagine that! Hypocrisy on the WSJ's OpEd page. And who better to dish the hypocrisy than Karl Rove?
Karl Rove offered a laundry list of items where Obama has reneged on campaign promises, and one of those promises is the signing statement. Rove has lept upon the recent information in last week's New York Times on how Obama has gone underground with his constitutional challenges, no longer using the signing statement, and instead using OLC opinions which are not always published. It is interesting that Rove relies upon this Times piece given how much effort the Bush administration expended trying to undermine it back in 2006 and 2007.
First, let's brush aside the things Rove got wrong. He argues that presidential signing statements date to "Andrew Jackson." They date to James Monroe. Rove argued: "Because of Washington's hyperpartisan atmosphere, President George W. Bush drew heated criticism from Democrats for his signing statements." Actually the criticism was bipartisan--and leading the attack was then Republican Arlen Specter, who held the Senate hearings on the Bush administration's use of the signing statement in June 2006.
Next he argues: "Among [Bush's] toughest critics was Barack Obama..." That simply is not true. Obama was not a leading critic of the Bush administration's use of the signing statement. In fact, among the toughest was Senator John McCain (R. AZ), who was the only candidate for the presidency in 2008 to swear off using the signing statement for any reason should be become president.
Now the hypocrisy, which Rove claims is all Obama's. Rove writes:
Wow. First, ever since the Reagan administration, it has been standard practice for the president's advisers to examine each bill to identify those provisions that warrant a challenge. In fact, up to the Bush administration, this was the sole duty of the Office of Legal Counsel inside the Department of Justice. If you want to complain about political advisers making suggestions about challenges, then Rove should have stayed in-house given that the vice president and his right hand man Addington were making decisions about challenges that contradicted the advice of the Office of Legal Counsel (guardians of the Constitution) as well as the President of the United States (see the 12/30/05 signing statement of the Detainee Treatment Act).
And second, Rove cannot possibly be condemning another administration about its lack of transparency in its use of the signing statement. If we go back to the strategy sessions in the Reagan Justice Department over the use of the constitutional signing statement, Samuel Alito, a young attorney in the DoJ, advised the use of constitutional challenges over bills where no one would pay much attention in an effort to slip it past the Congress. And then there is the Bush II administration. One of my Bush-era FOIA request asked for challenges that were reported to the Congress, which is a requirement written in statute. They gave me challenges made during the Clinton administration. This despite a GAO finding of several provisions of law that were not enforced. And then there are the signing statements themselves. Many were so vague that it was impossible to determine what was exactly being challenged or why. And then in 2007 and 2008, after public attention was drawn to the use of the signing statement, the challenges disappeared. Where did they go? It is clear they went underground to the OLC. I am convinced that the Obama administration's new strategy simply picks up where the Bush administration left off. Using the OLC to issue the challenges so as to avoid public scrutiny. My next round of FOIA requests will determine whether this is true or not.
So to me it takes a tremendous amount of moxie to criticize any administration for its lack of transparency given what the Bush administration did--often with the help of Rove--political operative par excellence! But then again, he picked the WSJ's OpEd page, which is never short on hypocrisy when it comes to criticizing Democrats.
Karl Rove offered a laundry list of items where Obama has reneged on campaign promises, and one of those promises is the signing statement. Rove has lept upon the recent information in last week's New York Times on how Obama has gone underground with his constitutional challenges, no longer using the signing statement, and instead using OLC opinions which are not always published. It is interesting that Rove relies upon this Times piece given how much effort the Bush administration expended trying to undermine it back in 2006 and 2007.
First, let's brush aside the things Rove got wrong. He argues that presidential signing statements date to "Andrew Jackson." They date to James Monroe. Rove argued: "Because of Washington's hyperpartisan atmosphere, President George W. Bush drew heated criticism from Democrats for his signing statements." Actually the criticism was bipartisan--and leading the attack was then Republican Arlen Specter, who held the Senate hearings on the Bush administration's use of the signing statement in June 2006.
Next he argues: "Among [Bush's] toughest critics was Barack Obama..." That simply is not true. Obama was not a leading critic of the Bush administration's use of the signing statement. In fact, among the toughest was Senator John McCain (R. AZ), who was the only candidate for the presidency in 2008 to swear off using the signing statement for any reason should be become president.
Now the hypocrisy, which Rove claims is all Obama's. Rove writes:
Recently, the Obama administration admitted that after receiving the letter from Messrs. Frank and Obey, it stopped the practice. But the president still has aides examine each bill to identify provisions the administration will disregard. It's just that Team Obama isn't telling Congress which provisions it is ignoring. It's right for him to defend the office of the presidency. The problem is that he is doing it in a way that violates his own standards of transparency and accountability.
Wow. First, ever since the Reagan administration, it has been standard practice for the president's advisers to examine each bill to identify those provisions that warrant a challenge. In fact, up to the Bush administration, this was the sole duty of the Office of Legal Counsel inside the Department of Justice. If you want to complain about political advisers making suggestions about challenges, then Rove should have stayed in-house given that the vice president and his right hand man Addington were making decisions about challenges that contradicted the advice of the Office of Legal Counsel (guardians of the Constitution) as well as the President of the United States (see the 12/30/05 signing statement of the Detainee Treatment Act).
And second, Rove cannot possibly be condemning another administration about its lack of transparency in its use of the signing statement. If we go back to the strategy sessions in the Reagan Justice Department over the use of the constitutional signing statement, Samuel Alito, a young attorney in the DoJ, advised the use of constitutional challenges over bills where no one would pay much attention in an effort to slip it past the Congress. And then there is the Bush II administration. One of my Bush-era FOIA request asked for challenges that were reported to the Congress, which is a requirement written in statute. They gave me challenges made during the Clinton administration. This despite a GAO finding of several provisions of law that were not enforced. And then there are the signing statements themselves. Many were so vague that it was impossible to determine what was exactly being challenged or why. And then in 2007 and 2008, after public attention was drawn to the use of the signing statement, the challenges disappeared. Where did they go? It is clear they went underground to the OLC. I am convinced that the Obama administration's new strategy simply picks up where the Bush administration left off. Using the OLC to issue the challenges so as to avoid public scrutiny. My next round of FOIA requests will determine whether this is true or not.
So to me it takes a tremendous amount of moxie to criticize any administration for its lack of transparency given what the Bush administration did--often with the help of Rove--political operative par excellence! But then again, he picked the WSJ's OpEd page, which is never short on hypocrisy when it comes to criticizing Democrats.
Friday, January 15, 2010
New Research on the Signing Statement
My colleague Bryan Marshall and I have a new publication in Social Science Quarterly (March 2010) that examines the various conditions that explain the use of the presidential signing statement. In the paper, we looked at such conditions as divided government, federal election cycles, and whether the legislation was major or minor, and found that presidents seek any condition to provide the opportunity to move unilaterally. Interestingly we find that presidents are as likely to use the constitutional signing statement during periods of unified government as during periods of divided government.
For the time being, the article is available online at the Social Science Quarterly website.
For the time being, the article is available online at the Social Science Quarterly website.
Saturday, January 09, 2010
Be Careful What You Ask For
Philip Cooper, in his excellent review of unilateral devices a decade or so ago, noted that when elites begin to focus on the way the president uses a unilateral device, the president will shift to a different device that accomplishes the exact same thing but does not come with the same public scrutiny baggage. In the 1990s there was a lot of scrutiny of the executive order, for example, which Clinton was using in order to accomplish policy goals shut out by the Republican Congress. So Clinton simply shifted to a different device, or "tool" as Cooper called it, such as the "memoranda" to take the place of the executive order. Different device, same effect. What was different was public scrutiny.
A unilateral device, as you readers well know, is something that the president uses to accomplish political goals. Their value is they allow the president to circumvent the Congress. Examples of unilateral devices: the executive order, memoranda, the presidential proclamation, the executive agreement, and the signing statement.
Today's New York Times has an article about the signing statement and its use by the Obama administration that may confirm Cooper's argument.
The article notes that the Obama administration has laid off using the constitutional signing statement since last summer despite signing bills that should have elicited challenges. If you recall, Obama set off a firestorm in the Congress last summer when he challenged provisions of law dealing with US participation in international institutions despite earlier compromising with the Congress to allow the prohibitions to go forward. Obama caught a left-right series of punches from Democrats and Republicans upset with the challenges. After that, Obama issued no more constitutional signing statements (though he has issued rhetorical signing statements since). Yet, as the article notes, Obama signed legislation last month that contained the exact same prohibitions but did not issue a constitutional signing statement challenge the provisions. Instead the administration argues there is no need to repeat the challenge because of their previous challenges, backed up with an OLC opinion claiming the right to ignore the provisions. But that opinion was for a different bill, which does not seem to bother the administration.
Interesting.
There are a number of different theories surrounding the reasons why a president issues a constitutional signing statement. One theory is you make the challenges to any infraction in any bill in case the issue lands in the courts--the president can point to a consistent set of challenges refusing enforcement, as happened with the legislative veto in the 1983 Chadha decision. A second theory suggests that they are used in an effort to influence judicial decisionmaking, which was behind many of the bills in the last couple of years attempting to limit the use of the signing statement. A third theory suggests that they are used to influence bureaucratic decisionmaking. It seems that that administration may be abandoning that first theory in the belief that these issues are not likely to end up before the courts, so why consistently draw attention to the constitutional signing statement by constantly repeating yourself with identical challenges?
They may also be hoping that new strategy, coupled with the numerous obstacles they have raised to track the use of the signing statement, will simply cause the issue to disappear as the public turns their attention elsewhere. Maybe. But they may be behaving as Cooper believed--turning to a different device that is harder to track. In the article, Jack Goldsmith, who worked in the OLC in the Bush II administration, notes that turning to the OLC opinion has advantages over the signing statement in that OLC opinions "are often secret," leading to "somewhat less accountability." Thus the only way you would know whether or not a challenge was made would be to try to monitor the behavior of those who work for the president, an incredibly daunting task that even the Congress has trouble doing.
It is ironic--this behavior is in direct relation to the abuse of the signing statement by President Bush II. His actions, which drew such high profile scrutiny of the signing statement did not lead to the disappearance of the device, but instead lead to driving it underground, leaving less accountability and scrutiny to a device that was already hard to track to begin with.
Be careful what you ask for, I guess.
A unilateral device, as you readers well know, is something that the president uses to accomplish political goals. Their value is they allow the president to circumvent the Congress. Examples of unilateral devices: the executive order, memoranda, the presidential proclamation, the executive agreement, and the signing statement.
Today's New York Times has an article about the signing statement and its use by the Obama administration that may confirm Cooper's argument.
The article notes that the Obama administration has laid off using the constitutional signing statement since last summer despite signing bills that should have elicited challenges. If you recall, Obama set off a firestorm in the Congress last summer when he challenged provisions of law dealing with US participation in international institutions despite earlier compromising with the Congress to allow the prohibitions to go forward. Obama caught a left-right series of punches from Democrats and Republicans upset with the challenges. After that, Obama issued no more constitutional signing statements (though he has issued rhetorical signing statements since). Yet, as the article notes, Obama signed legislation last month that contained the exact same prohibitions but did not issue a constitutional signing statement challenge the provisions. Instead the administration argues there is no need to repeat the challenge because of their previous challenges, backed up with an OLC opinion claiming the right to ignore the provisions. But that opinion was for a different bill, which does not seem to bother the administration.
Interesting.
There are a number of different theories surrounding the reasons why a president issues a constitutional signing statement. One theory is you make the challenges to any infraction in any bill in case the issue lands in the courts--the president can point to a consistent set of challenges refusing enforcement, as happened with the legislative veto in the 1983 Chadha decision. A second theory suggests that they are used in an effort to influence judicial decisionmaking, which was behind many of the bills in the last couple of years attempting to limit the use of the signing statement. A third theory suggests that they are used to influence bureaucratic decisionmaking. It seems that that administration may be abandoning that first theory in the belief that these issues are not likely to end up before the courts, so why consistently draw attention to the constitutional signing statement by constantly repeating yourself with identical challenges?
They may also be hoping that new strategy, coupled with the numerous obstacles they have raised to track the use of the signing statement, will simply cause the issue to disappear as the public turns their attention elsewhere. Maybe. But they may be behaving as Cooper believed--turning to a different device that is harder to track. In the article, Jack Goldsmith, who worked in the OLC in the Bush II administration, notes that turning to the OLC opinion has advantages over the signing statement in that OLC opinions "are often secret," leading to "somewhat less accountability." Thus the only way you would know whether or not a challenge was made would be to try to monitor the behavior of those who work for the president, an incredibly daunting task that even the Congress has trouble doing.
It is ironic--this behavior is in direct relation to the abuse of the signing statement by President Bush II. His actions, which drew such high profile scrutiny of the signing statement did not lead to the disappearance of the device, but instead lead to driving it underground, leaving less accountability and scrutiny to a device that was already hard to track to begin with.
Be careful what you ask for, I guess.
Wednesday, January 06, 2010
Meet the New Boss--Same as the Old Boss
SUNY-Cortland Professor Robert Spitzer, who studies the president and presidential power--and in particular the veto--took notice of, and responded to, an attempt by President Obama to use twist the language on the veto in a way to enhance the president's power over the Congress.
The issue is something known as the "protective return pocket veto," and Obama issued it on December 30 of last year (notice how it came on New Years Eve when no one was looking? Similar to President Bush's infamous torture signing statement of December 30, 2005). As Spitzer explains, the founders took pains to balance the relationship between the Congress and the president when it came to legislation.
As we all know, when the Congress passes a bill, it sends it to the president for his consideration. The president has ten days to act--sign it, not sign it, or veto it. Here is where the concern was--the veto gives the president a lot of control over legislation, and the Founders worried that it might be too much control. Thus instead of giving the president an absolute veto, they instead gave him a qualified veto, meaning that the Congress has the opportunity to override the veto, so long as it can must supermajorities in both chambers. The ten day clock was added to force the president to act, for without it the fear was the president would leave it on his desk and not act on legislation he did not like. On the other side, when the president vetoes a bill, he returns it to the Congress for action. Here is another potential problem dealt with by the Founders--what happens if Congress gives the president a bill that is controversial but then quickly adjourns, leaving him without anyone to return it to? In steps the pocket veto--any bill that has not run out the ten day clock when Congress adjourns is officially dead.
The protective return veto attempts to let the president have it both ways--vetoing a bill without sending it back to the Congress for action. President Obama's veto statement was titled "Memorandum of Disapproval"--which Spitzer notes is the nomenclature for the pocket veto, but in his message he wrote that the bill was vetoed though he cited Supreme Court precedent dealing with the pocket veto. As Spitzer argues, "...claiming the exercise of a non-return pocket veto while simultaneously returning the bill to Congress is a presidential power grab designed to stretch the no-override pocket veto into an absolute veto power that could be used anytime Congress is not in session, giving the president the very power the Founders sought to deny the office."
This practice of trying to add language to the veto power denied by the Founders was begun by Ford and pursued--despite Supreme Court opinion to the contrary--by each president since. It also is a practice that corresponds to the rise presidential unilateralism following Watergate--something many believed would disappear with Obama but clearly has not. And given his attempt at subterfuge by delivering it on New Years Eve, hopefully when no one was looking, is more evidence that the new boss is the same as the old boss.
The issue is something known as the "protective return pocket veto," and Obama issued it on December 30 of last year (notice how it came on New Years Eve when no one was looking? Similar to President Bush's infamous torture signing statement of December 30, 2005). As Spitzer explains, the founders took pains to balance the relationship between the Congress and the president when it came to legislation.
As we all know, when the Congress passes a bill, it sends it to the president for his consideration. The president has ten days to act--sign it, not sign it, or veto it. Here is where the concern was--the veto gives the president a lot of control over legislation, and the Founders worried that it might be too much control. Thus instead of giving the president an absolute veto, they instead gave him a qualified veto, meaning that the Congress has the opportunity to override the veto, so long as it can must supermajorities in both chambers. The ten day clock was added to force the president to act, for without it the fear was the president would leave it on his desk and not act on legislation he did not like. On the other side, when the president vetoes a bill, he returns it to the Congress for action. Here is another potential problem dealt with by the Founders--what happens if Congress gives the president a bill that is controversial but then quickly adjourns, leaving him without anyone to return it to? In steps the pocket veto--any bill that has not run out the ten day clock when Congress adjourns is officially dead.
The protective return veto attempts to let the president have it both ways--vetoing a bill without sending it back to the Congress for action. President Obama's veto statement was titled "Memorandum of Disapproval"--which Spitzer notes is the nomenclature for the pocket veto, but in his message he wrote that the bill was vetoed though he cited Supreme Court precedent dealing with the pocket veto. As Spitzer argues, "...claiming the exercise of a non-return pocket veto while simultaneously returning the bill to Congress is a presidential power grab designed to stretch the no-override pocket veto into an absolute veto power that could be used anytime Congress is not in session, giving the president the very power the Founders sought to deny the office."
This practice of trying to add language to the veto power denied by the Founders was begun by Ford and pursued--despite Supreme Court opinion to the contrary--by each president since. It also is a practice that corresponds to the rise presidential unilateralism following Watergate--something many believed would disappear with Obama but clearly has not. And given his attempt at subterfuge by delivering it on New Years Eve, hopefully when no one was looking, is more evidence that the new boss is the same as the old boss.
Asked and Answered?
So yesterday I asked why the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents--updated regularly since 1965--stopped getting updated once President Obama took office. Well rather than asking rhetorically, I sent a message to the Government Printing Office asking them what gives. To my surprise--given that it is the government and that I have FOIA requests that have not been answered for months--they answered me within a day! Here is there complete answer:
I think the last part is instructive: "The website will be updated frequently, as information is released by the White House press office to Federal Register editors." The fact of the matter still remains that this move to the daily releases has not necessarily made it any easier to monitor the behavior of the president.
The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents has been replaced by the Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents as of January 29, 2009. The Compilation of Presidential Documents collection is composed of the Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents and its predecessor, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. It is published by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the authority of the Federal Register Act, (44 U.S.C. Ch. 15; 1 CFR part 10).
This collection integrates material from the weekly publication dating from 1993, with Daily Compilation material as published from January 20, 2009 - forward. The website will be updated frequently, as information is released by the White House press office to Federal Register editors.
I think the last part is instructive: "The website will be updated frequently, as information is released by the White House press office to Federal Register editors." The fact of the matter still remains that this move to the daily releases has not necessarily made it any easier to monitor the behavior of the president.
Tuesday, January 05, 2010
Riddle Me Some More
For those who do research on the signing statement, the reliable place to go for the longest time has been the "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents." It has reliably been tracking everything that happens in the White House (within limits) since 1965, and since 1993 it has been online and searchable. Thus if you are looking for signing statements, all you need to enter is "Statement on Signing," and it will spit out each and every signing statement for that year. That is until the Obama administration.
If you are looking to the Weekly Comp to search out Obama signing statements, don't. As of January 26--just six days after Obama was inaugurated--the Weekly Comps stopped updating online. Instead, everything has seemingly shifted to the "Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents," which you can browse by month, but searching is a different question. If you want to search, you end up searching all government publications, which is not the same as searching one publication by year. So now if you enter "Statement on Signing", you will get your signing statements, but instead you will get all signing statements in the database.
I don't want to sound paranoid, but is it coincidence that trying to track the current president's signing statements just got harder and not easier?
If you are looking to the Weekly Comp to search out Obama signing statements, don't. As of January 26--just six days after Obama was inaugurated--the Weekly Comps stopped updating online. Instead, everything has seemingly shifted to the "Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents," which you can browse by month, but searching is a different question. If you want to search, you end up searching all government publications, which is not the same as searching one publication by year. So now if you enter "Statement on Signing", you will get your signing statements, but instead you will get all signing statements in the database.
I don't want to sound paranoid, but is it coincidence that trying to track the current president's signing statements just got harder and not easier?
Sunday, November 08, 2009
Signing Statements, Local Style
In the past, presidents have justified their use of the constitutional signing statement by referring to the practice of state governors use of constitutional signing statements, much the way presidents have referred to the power that governors have to use the line item veto as reasons to tamp down fears that this would give the president too much power over legislation. But what about other chief executives, such as big city mayors?
I have recently come across an interesting signing statement issued by the Mayor of Washington D.C., Adrian M. Fenty. DC's attorney general--Peter Nickles--has sent a memorandum to the city council citing 16 problematic sections of the 2010 city budget, six of which contain provisions that Nickels says will not be enforced. These six provisions seem mostly to violate separation of powers principles by allowing the council to exercise executive functions.
To be perfectly honest, I do not know much about local government and whether this is a new practice in DC or something that has been long standing. This story in one of Washington's alternative dailies, chock full of quotes from folks on the council, seem to suggest that this practice is new to the city. But what is interesting is just how instructive this challenge should be to the White House--particularly the Obama White House, which promised to be crystal clear in the challenges he issues to provisions of the law. In the Nickles memo, he details what section and subsection is a problem, what it is designed to do, and why it interferes with the prerogatives of the mayor.
I have recently come across an interesting signing statement issued by the Mayor of Washington D.C., Adrian M. Fenty. DC's attorney general--Peter Nickles--has sent a memorandum to the city council citing 16 problematic sections of the 2010 city budget, six of which contain provisions that Nickels says will not be enforced. These six provisions seem mostly to violate separation of powers principles by allowing the council to exercise executive functions.
To be perfectly honest, I do not know much about local government and whether this is a new practice in DC or something that has been long standing. This story in one of Washington's alternative dailies, chock full of quotes from folks on the council, seem to suggest that this practice is new to the city. But what is interesting is just how instructive this challenge should be to the White House--particularly the Obama White House, which promised to be crystal clear in the challenges he issues to provisions of the law. In the Nickles memo, he details what section and subsection is a problem, what it is designed to do, and why it interferes with the prerogatives of the mayor.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Just Like Bush
I have just completed a paper looking at the question of whether the unitary executive theory survived the Bush administration. In this paper, I look at how the Obama administration has exercised power consistent with the unitary executive, and that he has used the signing statement in a way that resembles his predecessors, including his immediate predecessor, George W. Bush.
President George W. Bush does not get much praise when it comes to his use of the signing statement, and most of the scorn is not misdirected. His administration's abuse of the signing statement--the blame I direct at his vice-president--has made it more difficult for his successor to use it without immediate criticism. Prior to the Bush administration, not many people, as I can attest, cared much at all about the signing statement. Not true today. But there were legitimate ways in which the Bush administration used the signing statement to challenge provisions of law (the so-called constitutional signing statement).
For example, as I documented a year ago, the Bush administration was handed a bill regarding India's nuclear program that had provisions that were offensive to the Indian Government and people because of provisions that seemed to weaken the territorial integrity of the country. As a way to mollify the Indian Government and keep them committed to US policy, the Bush administration showed them it's signing statement that challenged the controversial provisions. This made the Indians happy, and their objections were dropped.
Flash forward a year, and rather than the Indian Government, it is now Pakistan, and another foreign policy bill, though this time designed to provide Pakistan with security assistance for the next several years. Officially titled the "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009," it is more commonly referred to as the Kerry-Lugar Bill, after its two sponsors, Senators John Kerry (D. MA) and Richard Lugar (R. IN). In particular, there are provisions of the bill that seem to tell the Pakistani government how it should use its military and security forces or suggests that the Pakistan is not doing all it can to crack down on terrorist organizations housed inside the country. This has created some diplomatic problems for the United States. And what has the US done to temper the concerns of the Pakistani leadership?
According to this story in "The International News," the proposed way out is a potential signing statement to challenge the contentious provisions of the bill. It notes that though the bill becomes law with the contentious provisions intact, "...the people of Pakistan would have a word from the President of the United States that America respects Pakistan's sovereignty" because the "statement that the...president makes, when he signs a bill into a law, is also meant to explain the president's intent how to execute, or carry out, the law including giving guidance to his administration..."
Thus the signing statement becomes a completely legitimate, and necessary, device that allows the president to deal with the twin pressures that come from the domestic and international spheres. It is funny that this story of the signing statement--particularly the constitutional signing statement, does not get told, unless you are privy to international newspapers, which covered this fairly extensively.
President George W. Bush does not get much praise when it comes to his use of the signing statement, and most of the scorn is not misdirected. His administration's abuse of the signing statement--the blame I direct at his vice-president--has made it more difficult for his successor to use it without immediate criticism. Prior to the Bush administration, not many people, as I can attest, cared much at all about the signing statement. Not true today. But there were legitimate ways in which the Bush administration used the signing statement to challenge provisions of law (the so-called constitutional signing statement).
For example, as I documented a year ago, the Bush administration was handed a bill regarding India's nuclear program that had provisions that were offensive to the Indian Government and people because of provisions that seemed to weaken the territorial integrity of the country. As a way to mollify the Indian Government and keep them committed to US policy, the Bush administration showed them it's signing statement that challenged the controversial provisions. This made the Indians happy, and their objections were dropped.
Flash forward a year, and rather than the Indian Government, it is now Pakistan, and another foreign policy bill, though this time designed to provide Pakistan with security assistance for the next several years. Officially titled the "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009," it is more commonly referred to as the Kerry-Lugar Bill, after its two sponsors, Senators John Kerry (D. MA) and Richard Lugar (R. IN). In particular, there are provisions of the bill that seem to tell the Pakistani government how it should use its military and security forces or suggests that the Pakistan is not doing all it can to crack down on terrorist organizations housed inside the country. This has created some diplomatic problems for the United States. And what has the US done to temper the concerns of the Pakistani leadership?
According to this story in "The International News," the proposed way out is a potential signing statement to challenge the contentious provisions of the bill. It notes that though the bill becomes law with the contentious provisions intact, "...the people of Pakistan would have a word from the President of the United States that America respects Pakistan's sovereignty" because the "statement that the...president makes, when he signs a bill into a law, is also meant to explain the president's intent how to execute, or carry out, the law including giving guidance to his administration..."
Thus the signing statement becomes a completely legitimate, and necessary, device that allows the president to deal with the twin pressures that come from the domestic and international spheres. It is funny that this story of the signing statement--particularly the constitutional signing statement, does not get told, unless you are privy to international newspapers, which covered this fairly extensively.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Cool Database Alert
Brandon Rottinghaus and Jeremy Bailey, two presidential scholars of note, have gotten their database on presidential proclamations up and running. The database has some 10,000 proclamations from the past to the present and should be a tremendous asset for anyone who does research on the presidency, presidential power, presidential rhetoric, presidential unilateralism, or is just interested in the development of the American Presidency.
Most people probably think of the proclamation as a meaningless rhetorical device--such as when the President issues a proclamation pardoning a turkey on Thanksgiving (maybe Obama can pardon Representative Wilson this Thanksgiving?), but in reality the proclamation can also be used in the service of exercising substantial power, as in the case of declaring thousands of acres of land public land. Clinton made use of the proclamation just for this very purposes, infuriating land developers out West.
Play around with the database. You won't be sorry.
Most people probably think of the proclamation as a meaningless rhetorical device--such as when the President issues a proclamation pardoning a turkey on Thanksgiving (maybe Obama can pardon Representative Wilson this Thanksgiving?), but in reality the proclamation can also be used in the service of exercising substantial power, as in the case of declaring thousands of acres of land public land. Clinton made use of the proclamation just for this very purposes, infuriating land developers out West.
Play around with the database. You won't be sorry.
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
Another Publication
Got confirmation that my co-authored article (with Bryan Marshall), "Going it Alone: The Politics of Signing Statements from Reagan to Bush II" just got the green light for publication in the journal Social Science Quarterly. It will appear in the March, 2010 issue of the journal. One of the peer reviewer suggested that we read some of the work on the signing statement done by Christopher Kelley! It is nice that folks know my work.
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Apologists
During the Bush administration, whenever controversy arouse, there would be the defenders in the media to rebut the claims--in essence--to apologize for its transgressions. Now that the Democrats control the White House, the apologists on the Left have come out. Case in point is Mori Dinauer at The American Prospect. She has a blurb today defending Obama's use of the signing statement. At point is Charlie Savage's NYT piece a couple of days ago that was critical of the signing statements issued so far by President Obama. She writes:
The apology comes in that final statement: Bush's statements were all grounded in "an absurd theory of presidential authority" while Obama has not "mentioned" the theory once--the theory of course is the unitary executive. Actually, if you are worried about president's acting in accordance to the theory, then you want a President Bush who overtly defends aggressive actions via the unitary executive. As I have noted elsewhere, the unitary executive is alive and well inside the Executive Branch--having been placed there through careful use by Presidents Reagan, BushI, Clinton, and Bush II. The problem is that until the Bush II administration, it was subtle in the actions the presidents took. Presidents Reagan and Bush I referred to it on just a couple of occasions and President Clinton never did. But if you look at the actions these Presidents took, then it was easy to see the theory at play. The same is true for President Obama. There is really nothing in his actions to date to suggest that he is behaving any differently, and for good reason. The theory allows the president to accomplish things that cannot be accomplished working with others.
So before we breathe a sigh of relief or before we admonish others for being quick to jump to conclusions, we should look to the actions the president takes and match them with the tenets of the theory. You might be surprised.
There's no journalist who understands the issue of presidential signing statements better than Charlie Savage, but his New York Times story today on Obama's use of the tactic almost feels premature. We learn that the president has "relaxed his criteria for what kinds of signing statements are appropriate," this has "riled" some congressional Democrats, and the American Bar Association's most recent president doesn't believe signing statements are an "appropriate practice." The problem is that while Bush's signing statements were all grounded in an absurd theory of presidential authority, Obama's have avoided mention of any such underlying theory.
The apology comes in that final statement: Bush's statements were all grounded in "an absurd theory of presidential authority" while Obama has not "mentioned" the theory once--the theory of course is the unitary executive. Actually, if you are worried about president's acting in accordance to the theory, then you want a President Bush who overtly defends aggressive actions via the unitary executive. As I have noted elsewhere, the unitary executive is alive and well inside the Executive Branch--having been placed there through careful use by Presidents Reagan, BushI, Clinton, and Bush II. The problem is that until the Bush II administration, it was subtle in the actions the presidents took. Presidents Reagan and Bush I referred to it on just a couple of occasions and President Clinton never did. But if you look at the actions these Presidents took, then it was easy to see the theory at play. The same is true for President Obama. There is really nothing in his actions to date to suggest that he is behaving any differently, and for good reason. The theory allows the president to accomplish things that cannot be accomplished working with others.
So before we breathe a sigh of relief or before we admonish others for being quick to jump to conclusions, we should look to the actions the president takes and match them with the tenets of the theory. You might be surprised.
Sunday, August 09, 2009
A Unitarian or Not?
Charlie Savage of the New York Times has a report in yesterday's newspaper on the signing statement and the Bush administration that sums up where the debate on the device and its use by the administration is today. My thanks to Charlie for throwing some light my way by citing my data on the numbers of signing statements per president, which can be found on my webpage stretching back to the Reagan administration.
There are a couple of points in the column that merit comment. Toward the bottom, Savage writes:
This represents a problem for those like me who research the signing statement--the neglect that rhetorical signing statements receive simply because they are not as sexy as their constitutional brethren. To date, Obama has issued 13 signing statements of which 5 can be classified as constitutional. What this means is that 5 signing statements contained provisions that challenged the constitutionality--or interpreted--provisions of the bill contrary to legislative intent. The majority--which has been the case to date for every president BUT the two Bush's--issued more rhetorical signing statements than constitutional ones. The rhetorical signing statement is designed to draw public (press/congressional/international) attention to the bill the president signs.
It is important that we do not forget both have important implications for power.
Later, Savage writes:
We must be cautious not to make the assumption that because he does not use the phrase "unitary executive theory" that it is not there. The unitary executive theory, developed by attorneys in the Reagan administration, has been around now through four successive presidencies. It's tenets buried deeply within and throughout the entire Executive Branch. And it was rare for a president to refer to it specifically and deliberately until the previous Bush administration, which could not stop mentioning it whenever and wherever it had the chance. But because the president does not say it aloud does not mean it is not there. The Clinton administration never used the term, and yet it supported its key tenets as much as the Republicans before and after did.
So look at the facts: Obama has people in key places--for instance the DOJ--who are proponents of the theory (see for instance the work of Solicitor General Elena Kagan). He has not revoked an executive order born out of the Reagan administration empowering the OMB--and in particular the OIRA--to monitor the behavior (on behalf of the White House) of the executive branch agents. And he continues to use the signing statement to advance principles of departmentalism, which is consistent with a key tenet of the theory.
So while Obama may not be behaving like his predecessor, the evidence thus far confirms that he is behaving like a unitarian.
There are a couple of points in the column that merit comment. Toward the bottom, Savage writes:
Mr. Obama has attached signing statements to 5 of the 42 bills he has signed, focusing on 19 specific provisions. He also challenged, without listing them, “numerous provisions” in a budget bill requiring officials to obtain permission from a Congressional committee before spending money. It contained dozens of such requirements.
This represents a problem for those like me who research the signing statement--the neglect that rhetorical signing statements receive simply because they are not as sexy as their constitutional brethren. To date, Obama has issued 13 signing statements of which 5 can be classified as constitutional. What this means is that 5 signing statements contained provisions that challenged the constitutionality--or interpreted--provisions of the bill contrary to legislative intent. The majority--which has been the case to date for every president BUT the two Bush's--issued more rhetorical signing statements than constitutional ones. The rhetorical signing statement is designed to draw public (press/congressional/international) attention to the bill the president signs.
It is important that we do not forget both have important implications for power.
Later, Savage writes:
Still, unlike Mr. Bush, Mr. Obama has not mentioned the Unitary Executive Theory, an expansive view of executive power that conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. His only invocation of his commander-in-chief authority was limited, taking aim at a requirement that he get permission from a military subordinate before taking an action.
We must be cautious not to make the assumption that because he does not use the phrase "unitary executive theory" that it is not there. The unitary executive theory, developed by attorneys in the Reagan administration, has been around now through four successive presidencies. It's tenets buried deeply within and throughout the entire Executive Branch. And it was rare for a president to refer to it specifically and deliberately until the previous Bush administration, which could not stop mentioning it whenever and wherever it had the chance. But because the president does not say it aloud does not mean it is not there. The Clinton administration never used the term, and yet it supported its key tenets as much as the Republicans before and after did.
So look at the facts: Obama has people in key places--for instance the DOJ--who are proponents of the theory (see for instance the work of Solicitor General Elena Kagan). He has not revoked an executive order born out of the Reagan administration empowering the OMB--and in particular the OIRA--to monitor the behavior (on behalf of the White House) of the executive branch agents. And he continues to use the signing statement to advance principles of departmentalism, which is consistent with a key tenet of the theory.
So while Obama may not be behaving like his predecessor, the evidence thus far confirms that he is behaving like a unitarian.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Read Between the Lines
Bob Egelko, a fine reporter with the San Francisco Chronicle, has an interesting blurb from last Friday's paper on a talk that our new Solicitor General, Elena Kagan, had at the annual meeting of judges and lawyers of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Kagan, a former Dean of Harvard Law School, held a job as a Clinton policy adviser and penned a telling article several years ago defending much of what many consider powers consistent with the unitary executive theory--though she did not come out and say as much.
On Friday, she was asked whether she would refuse defense of the law, as something each administration in the past has done at least on one occasion? Her answer: "I owe clear obligations to Congress...one of the most important parts of the solicitor general's job is to defend" the law. This would seem, as I suggested to Mr. Egelko, that perhaps Kagan used the talk to molify the anger amongst congressional Democrats over President Obama's recent signing statement. But there seems to be a bit of a contradiction, or perhaps a qualification, in Kagan's statement.
Over at dagblog, one blogger who also attended the conference provides a bit more detail. He also heard Kagan's praise of the legislative branch when asked about defending the law when the administration believes it to be unconstitutional:
This appears to not only be a bone tossed in the direction of the Congress, but also a blunt statement where Kagan is making a break with the Bush Justice Department, which was so politicized that we are still dealing with the ramifications of actions taken years ago. Yet later in the proceedings, Ms. Kagan was asked about signing statements, and gave an answer that seemed to conflict with her first:
Whoa! Looking backwards, when was a solicitor general ordered to refuse defense of the law when the president believed it violated his personal politics and not the Constitution? In the cases that leap to my mind, never. FDR refused defense of a law demanding that three State Department officials be punished because the Congress did not like them--he believed that violated the Constitution's ban on bills of attainder and the Supreme Court agreed. Arguing on behalf of the law? Attorneys hired by the Congress. The Carter administration refused defense of any law it considered to be a legislative veto, which violated the Constitution's principles of bicameralism and presentment. And the Supreme Court agreed. Arguing on behalf of the law? Attorneys provided by the Congress. President Clinton refused defense of a law that kicked out of the military and pulled health care to any military personnel testing HIV-positive. Before that could be tested, the Congress overturned the law. The fact of the matter is that when the president refuses defense of the law--just like when he refuses enforcement--it is because he believes it violates a constitutional principle.
And I am sure Ms. Kagan knows it as well.
Kagan, a former Dean of Harvard Law School, held a job as a Clinton policy adviser and penned a telling article several years ago defending much of what many consider powers consistent with the unitary executive theory--though she did not come out and say as much.
On Friday, she was asked whether she would refuse defense of the law, as something each administration in the past has done at least on one occasion? Her answer: "I owe clear obligations to Congress...one of the most important parts of the solicitor general's job is to defend" the law. This would seem, as I suggested to Mr. Egelko, that perhaps Kagan used the talk to molify the anger amongst congressional Democrats over President Obama's recent signing statement. But there seems to be a bit of a contradiction, or perhaps a qualification, in Kagan's statement.
Over at dagblog, one blogger who also attended the conference provides a bit more detail. He also heard Kagan's praise of the legislative branch when asked about defending the law when the administration believes it to be unconstitutional:
Chief Judge Kozinski asked about the tension between Kagan's duties to the Executive branch, and to other agencies of the government. As she responded, her office owes an important obligation to the Legislative, in particular to defend the constitutionality of statutes, and the special historical relationship of the Solicitor General with the Supreme Court, redolent with such duties of candor that the SG is prone to confessions of error and other self-critical statements seldom passing the lips of lawyers. As she concluded this section of remarks, she made the point private lawyers will appreciate: her client is none of the branches or actors, but is instead the entire United States Government.
This appears to not only be a bone tossed in the direction of the Congress, but also a blunt statement where Kagan is making a break with the Bush Justice Department, which was so politicized that we are still dealing with the ramifications of actions taken years ago. Yet later in the proceedings, Ms. Kagan was asked about signing statements, and gave an answer that seemed to conflict with her first:
On to audience questions. Signing statements? Kagan initially picks at the question, because of the tension between her role as advocate for the Executive, acknowledging
that the topic is a hotly contested one. Finally, she answers frontally: when in conflict between the legislative goal of affirming the validity of legislation, and protection of the authority of the executive, the executive prevails in her office.
Whoa! Looking backwards, when was a solicitor general ordered to refuse defense of the law when the president believed it violated his personal politics and not the Constitution? In the cases that leap to my mind, never. FDR refused defense of a law demanding that three State Department officials be punished because the Congress did not like them--he believed that violated the Constitution's ban on bills of attainder and the Supreme Court agreed. Arguing on behalf of the law? Attorneys hired by the Congress. The Carter administration refused defense of any law it considered to be a legislative veto, which violated the Constitution's principles of bicameralism and presentment. And the Supreme Court agreed. Arguing on behalf of the law? Attorneys provided by the Congress. President Clinton refused defense of a law that kicked out of the military and pulled health care to any military personnel testing HIV-positive. Before that could be tested, the Congress overturned the law. The fact of the matter is that when the president refuses defense of the law--just like when he refuses enforcement--it is because he believes it violates a constitutional principle.
And I am sure Ms. Kagan knows it as well.
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Midnight Regulations
Susan Dudley, faculty in the Regulatory Studies Program at the Mercatus Center of George Mason University, and a former recess head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) inside the OMB during the final two years of George W. Bush, has an interesting article in the current issue of Engage, published by the Federalist Society, a conservative legal organization founded in the 1980s by attorneys in the Reagan administration.
Titled "Regulatory Activity in the Bush Administration at the Stroke of Midnight," she looks at the problem of a mountain of regulations pouring in as a president is winding down his final days in office. The regulatory process is one where a president can put his stamp on policy without the mess of trying to work policy through the legislative process. As a president is leaving office, this process jumps into overdrive. It is also a way the president can tie the hands of an incoming administration when that new administration is from the opposing party. Thus in 2000-2001, the Clinton administration issued regs lowering the permissible levels of arsenic in drinking water which gave the Bush administration a giant headache as it attempted to overturn the regulation and restore it to the original level. Generally speaking, when the new administration comes to power, any regulation that has not been finalized gets thrown out the door, which can be frustrating to career bureaucrats who put in a great deal of work only to see the fruits of their labor pitched into the garbage can.
Last year, Bush's Chief of Staff, Josh Bolten, sent out a memo to all departments and agencies demanding that any new regulation be finalized by November 1, 2008 to insure that 1) bureaucratic efforts are not wasted and 2) to insure that the president's policy stamp is protected and maximized. Thus, as a result of this order, incoming Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel threw out "significantly fewer regulations than had Chief of Staff Andy Card" in 2001.
Thus as a result of this order, the administration was able to insure passage of key policies to which President Bush wanted to be remembered for:
* An HHS order protecting medical practitioners from performing services that violated their beliefs;
* A DOI order allowing mountain top mining;
* Treasury order restricting internet gambling.
More importantly, and a subtext to her piece, the order made sure that organized interest groups did not have their way with the treasury by pushing through thousands of regulations while the president and his staff were distracted with the business of leaving office.
Now there is an element of "nothing is as it seems" to this piece. In one part, she highlights how well the Bush administration cut down on "midnight regulations" that end up junked by the new administration when compared to previous administrations. But, when you expand the time period under study--to the last full year in office--you find that the administration issued more regulations than the previous year. So simply by moving the "drop dead" date from noon January 20 of the new year to November 1 of the last year, you have put on notice when the executive branch agencies have to finish the "president's work." To put it a different way, the Bush administration's policy maximized the president's advantage in the final year's regulatory output to insure favored regulations passed while those not favored died. In previous administrations, both ended up getting through because a president and his team simply concentrated on those important things that needed accomplished while organized interests also got their way.
Thus the Bush administration's policy simply advanced the president's power in the never ending saga of political institutions seeking advantage over others that has been a part of our system since 1789.
Titled "Regulatory Activity in the Bush Administration at the Stroke of Midnight," she looks at the problem of a mountain of regulations pouring in as a president is winding down his final days in office. The regulatory process is one where a president can put his stamp on policy without the mess of trying to work policy through the legislative process. As a president is leaving office, this process jumps into overdrive. It is also a way the president can tie the hands of an incoming administration when that new administration is from the opposing party. Thus in 2000-2001, the Clinton administration issued regs lowering the permissible levels of arsenic in drinking water which gave the Bush administration a giant headache as it attempted to overturn the regulation and restore it to the original level. Generally speaking, when the new administration comes to power, any regulation that has not been finalized gets thrown out the door, which can be frustrating to career bureaucrats who put in a great deal of work only to see the fruits of their labor pitched into the garbage can.
Last year, Bush's Chief of Staff, Josh Bolten, sent out a memo to all departments and agencies demanding that any new regulation be finalized by November 1, 2008 to insure that 1) bureaucratic efforts are not wasted and 2) to insure that the president's policy stamp is protected and maximized. Thus, as a result of this order, incoming Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel threw out "significantly fewer regulations than had Chief of Staff Andy Card" in 2001.
Thus as a result of this order, the administration was able to insure passage of key policies to which President Bush wanted to be remembered for:
* An HHS order protecting medical practitioners from performing services that violated their beliefs;
* A DOI order allowing mountain top mining;
* Treasury order restricting internet gambling.
More importantly, and a subtext to her piece, the order made sure that organized interest groups did not have their way with the treasury by pushing through thousands of regulations while the president and his staff were distracted with the business of leaving office.
Now there is an element of "nothing is as it seems" to this piece. In one part, she highlights how well the Bush administration cut down on "midnight regulations" that end up junked by the new administration when compared to previous administrations. But, when you expand the time period under study--to the last full year in office--you find that the administration issued more regulations than the previous year. So simply by moving the "drop dead" date from noon January 20 of the new year to November 1 of the last year, you have put on notice when the executive branch agencies have to finish the "president's work." To put it a different way, the Bush administration's policy maximized the president's advantage in the final year's regulatory output to insure favored regulations passed while those not favored died. In previous administrations, both ended up getting through because a president and his team simply concentrated on those important things that needed accomplished while organized interests also got their way.
Thus the Bush administration's policy simply advanced the president's power in the never ending saga of political institutions seeking advantage over others that has been a part of our system since 1789.
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