I was checking the news releases at the White House homepage this evening when I came across an interesting blurb from yesterday's news. It states simply: On June 14, 2007, the President signed into law S. 214, the "Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007." When I took a look at what S.214, it places limitations upon the president's appointment power and also mixes up the separate powers by allowing a district court to appoint a US attorney until a vacancy is filled.
I immediately wondered why there was no signing statement to this bill, because this is the kind of legislation ripe to draw a signing statement that says something like this: the president has the sole authority to appoint inferior officers as the head of the unitary executive branch. Since there was no signing statement, I looked to see what the Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) said about this bill, and lo and behold, there was no SAP as well. What gives?
Well, here is the long and short of the story. S.214 strikes out an amendment added to the Patriot Act reauthorization last year by Senator Specter which eliminated a practice that had existed for decades prior to Specter's Amendment. The practice dictated that when a vacancy occurred in a US attorney position, the Attorney General had 120 days to make an interim appointment so long as it was not a person who the Senate had already rejected. At the end of the 120 day period, if a successor was not appointed, then the district court could appoint the person until the vacancy was filled.
To give you a sense of just how much the Congress enabled the exercise of power in the first six years of the Bush presidency, Senator Specter's amendment eliminated the district court's role in the process and allowed the AG to appoint a person permanently or until the vacancy was filled. The only thing that remained was the prohibition on naming someone who had already been rejected.
So the White House could get around the confirmation process by naming an interim attorney (say eight persons recently canned for performance related issues/because they serve at the pleasure of the president/because they would not engage in political prosecutions/persecutions) who would serve while the administration "searched" for a suitable replacement.
S. 214, introduced by the honchos in charge, simply reset the process as it existed for the 20 years or so prior to Specter's actions last year. According to the bill's author Senator Diane Feinstein (D. CA), the administration planned to target those attorneys who were either not playing ball (politics) or who occupied a position promised to a political hack, force them to resign, and then skirt accountability by appointing an interim attorney who would not have to answer to the Senate. The Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, initially blasted the legislation, promising vigorous opposition because the attorneys serve at the pleasure of president (while staying mum on the other crucial part, that they serve at the pleasure of the president "after receiving confirmation from the Senate). In an effort to short-circuit the legislation, Gonzales promised to bring every interim appointment to the Senate for hearings and a vote.
In the end, that wasn't enough. This past March, after Gonzales had received his first round of spankings from the Congress, he dropped his opposition to the bill, signaling to the Senate that the administration would not stand in the way. If the Democrats managed to get it out of Congress, then the President promised to sign it, which he did yesterday.
This is extraordinary, and yet there doesn't seem to be much discussion in the usual places, particularly those who howl that the administration bends to no one. That the unitary executive is code for absolute monarchy, a king who neither listens to the public or the law. And yet politics in this case--the white heat the administration has taken over the firings of a few select US attorneys demonstrates that there are limits to how far the power of the president can be stretched. As I have argued elsewhere, the unitary executive theory assumes vigorous offense and defense from all the branches. The only reason it seemed so stark these past couple of years is because the Congress was not living up to its side of the bargain. Well now you see that a Congress, backed by the public, can provide limits when presidential power goes too far.
Friday, June 15, 2007
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
Censure, the CRS, and Lou Fisher
I am a big fan of the Congressional Research Service Reports because they are concise and chock full of nitty-gritty types of information. They also tend to be reliable because they are non-partisan (unless you are Louis Fisher, where his defense of the Congress was taken as a partisan swipe at the President, leading to his removal from CRS) and usually very accurate. They also are hard to come by because Members of Congress will not allow them to be placed on a public server to be downloaded for free despite the fact that we, as taxpayers, pay for them.
Fortunately the Federation of American Scientists obtain the CRS Reports and provide them for free to anyone who comes looking for them. If you subscribe to the Project on Government Secrecy listserv, FAS will even email you updates to the most recent Reports it obtains.
Today, among the numerous CRS Reports was one that looked at the meaning of congressional votes of censure or loss of confidence. This is likely driven by the recent attempt by the Senate to hold a "vote of no confidence" against AG Alberto Gonzales.
The Report provides an overview (along with several pages in Appendices with tables) of attempts by the Congress to hold censure or no confidence votes against the President or his underlings. While the Report makes a nice acquisition to your library, it is incomplete and in parts, wrong.
It correctly notes that "no confidence" or even "censure" are tools more appropriate for parliamentary systems, where the functions of government are mixed. Here, outside of impeachment, there is little by way of punishment that the Congress can mete against the President or his staff. That is--and where the Report does not go--there is little constitutional backing for censure or no confidence. Rhetorically however, there is a lot of force behind them. No President wishes to have a legacy where the Congress held no confidence in him or the people he hired to work for him. In fact, the mere threat by the Congress to hold censure or no confidence votes on the floor of either chamber is often enough to buckle the knees of the President (see, for instance, the episodes in the early 1980s involving the EPA administrator Anne Gorsuch or Secretary of Interior James Watt.) If the Congress can successfully pull off this kind of a vote, it means that, in all likelihood, the President himself has lost, or is about to lose, the support of the people. So while the constitutional separation of powers means that there is little behind an effort to vote censure or no confidence, unofficially there is a lot to the devices. If not, there would not have been so much pressure by the administration on weakened Senators to get them to vote against a vote of no-confidence.
So the CRS is not being complete in the Report to the Congress, or to whichever member requested it.
Second, the CRS Report is incomplete on why there doesn't seem to be as much activity in the 19th century to vote no confidence or censure against a sitting President and/or his inferior officers. They assume that the lack of electronic documents makes it difficult to conduct the kind of search that today allows them to identify all these actions. Maybe. However, I would believe that it had more to do with the political power of the Congress in the 19th century that made such an action unnecessary. The contemporary presidency is nothing like its 19th century counterpart. That person had little to no staff. His inferior officers were picked by the Congress. And not only did he have to seek the advice and consent of the Senate in order to appoint his officers, but he also was required to seek the advice and consent of the Senate to fire inferior officers, or face impeachment as Andrew Johnson had when he refused to listen to the Congress when he moved against a Cabinet officer. Thus it is more likely that the Congress had the political resources to deal with a President or Cabinet officers that were not doing what the Congress wanted them to do.
This line of thought leads me to an important omission in the Report. On Page 6, it discusses earlier examples of censure or no-confidence, starting with "a series of resolutions proposing the censure and disapproval of Secretary Alexander Hamilton in 1793," which seemed to be initiated by Thomas Jefferson, working through a Member of the House of Representatives. The Report then jumps to 1860s, and a censure resolution against President Buchanan and his Secretary of Navy.
This represents the glaring omission. It doesn't say a thing about the successful censure of President Andrew Jackson in 1834 as a result of the "Battle over the Bank" that defined much of Jackson's Presidency. When Jackson declared War on the Bank of the United States, he moved money out of the Bank, fired the Secretary of the Treasury, and dared the Congress to impeach him, which it could not do largely due to the popularity of Jackson. Instead, it voted to censure the President in what the Senate Historian refers to as "an unprecedented and never-repeated tactic." Jackson wrote a lengthy letter in protest, and demanded that the letter be printed in the Senate Journal, which the Senate refused to do. Jackson fought against that censure, successfully in 1837 when he got a sympathetic Senate to expunge the record and remove what he considered to be a blackmark on his presidency.
Thus it illustrates that the censure is a political, and not a constitutional device; that may have no effect on the presidency constitutionally, but certainly has great political impact; and that is a device with deep lineage in American history.
CRS would have known that if they would have had a copy of Louis Fisher's Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President, or if they would not have gotten rid of Fisher himself.
Fortunately the Federation of American Scientists obtain the CRS Reports and provide them for free to anyone who comes looking for them. If you subscribe to the Project on Government Secrecy listserv, FAS will even email you updates to the most recent Reports it obtains.
Today, among the numerous CRS Reports was one that looked at the meaning of congressional votes of censure or loss of confidence. This is likely driven by the recent attempt by the Senate to hold a "vote of no confidence" against AG Alberto Gonzales.
The Report provides an overview (along with several pages in Appendices with tables) of attempts by the Congress to hold censure or no confidence votes against the President or his underlings. While the Report makes a nice acquisition to your library, it is incomplete and in parts, wrong.
It correctly notes that "no confidence" or even "censure" are tools more appropriate for parliamentary systems, where the functions of government are mixed. Here, outside of impeachment, there is little by way of punishment that the Congress can mete against the President or his staff. That is--and where the Report does not go--there is little constitutional backing for censure or no confidence. Rhetorically however, there is a lot of force behind them. No President wishes to have a legacy where the Congress held no confidence in him or the people he hired to work for him. In fact, the mere threat by the Congress to hold censure or no confidence votes on the floor of either chamber is often enough to buckle the knees of the President (see, for instance, the episodes in the early 1980s involving the EPA administrator Anne Gorsuch or Secretary of Interior James Watt.) If the Congress can successfully pull off this kind of a vote, it means that, in all likelihood, the President himself has lost, or is about to lose, the support of the people. So while the constitutional separation of powers means that there is little behind an effort to vote censure or no confidence, unofficially there is a lot to the devices. If not, there would not have been so much pressure by the administration on weakened Senators to get them to vote against a vote of no-confidence.
So the CRS is not being complete in the Report to the Congress, or to whichever member requested it.
Second, the CRS Report is incomplete on why there doesn't seem to be as much activity in the 19th century to vote no confidence or censure against a sitting President and/or his inferior officers. They assume that the lack of electronic documents makes it difficult to conduct the kind of search that today allows them to identify all these actions. Maybe. However, I would believe that it had more to do with the political power of the Congress in the 19th century that made such an action unnecessary. The contemporary presidency is nothing like its 19th century counterpart. That person had little to no staff. His inferior officers were picked by the Congress. And not only did he have to seek the advice and consent of the Senate in order to appoint his officers, but he also was required to seek the advice and consent of the Senate to fire inferior officers, or face impeachment as Andrew Johnson had when he refused to listen to the Congress when he moved against a Cabinet officer. Thus it is more likely that the Congress had the political resources to deal with a President or Cabinet officers that were not doing what the Congress wanted them to do.
This line of thought leads me to an important omission in the Report. On Page 6, it discusses earlier examples of censure or no-confidence, starting with "a series of resolutions proposing the censure and disapproval of Secretary Alexander Hamilton in 1793," which seemed to be initiated by Thomas Jefferson, working through a Member of the House of Representatives. The Report then jumps to 1860s, and a censure resolution against President Buchanan and his Secretary of Navy.
This represents the glaring omission. It doesn't say a thing about the successful censure of President Andrew Jackson in 1834 as a result of the "Battle over the Bank" that defined much of Jackson's Presidency. When Jackson declared War on the Bank of the United States, he moved money out of the Bank, fired the Secretary of the Treasury, and dared the Congress to impeach him, which it could not do largely due to the popularity of Jackson. Instead, it voted to censure the President in what the Senate Historian refers to as "an unprecedented and never-repeated tactic." Jackson wrote a lengthy letter in protest, and demanded that the letter be printed in the Senate Journal, which the Senate refused to do. Jackson fought against that censure, successfully in 1837 when he got a sympathetic Senate to expunge the record and remove what he considered to be a blackmark on his presidency.
Thus it illustrates that the censure is a political, and not a constitutional device; that may have no effect on the presidency constitutionally, but certainly has great political impact; and that is a device with deep lineage in American history.
CRS would have known that if they would have had a copy of Louis Fisher's Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President, or if they would not have gotten rid of Fisher himself.
Tuesday, June 12, 2007
The People's President
From time to time an article in one of the leading journals of Political Science catches my attention, and I often wish there was a "letter to the editor" option that would allow me to comment directly ("please include more articles like this one" or "which peer-reviewers didn't read the most recent article you published?"). The most recent edition of Perspectives in Politics has an article of the second category.
The article, "Anti-Intellectualism in the Modern Presidency: A Republican Populism,(read the abstract here)" and written by Colleen J. Shogan, makes the argument that some recent Republican Presidents--emblematic of the modern Republican Party--have embraced anti-intellectualism as a governing strategy. And because these Presidents come to office with limited curiosity and a predisposition to distrust intellectuals, there may be profound consequences for all of us living under a Republican administration. In fact, this article made me squeamish because it is the sort of thing that gives Howlers like David Horowitz ammunition that academia is lined up against conservatives and Republicans.
Anti-intellectualism is defined as "the attainment of knowledge through instincts, character, moral sensibilities, and emotions (295)" and someone whose approach to life is anti-intellectual "disparages the rational complexity associated with intellectual pursuits,...[as well as exhibiting a] distaste for the smugness and superiority they believe accompanies intellectual life. (295-96)" She places her presidents on a continuum with anti-intellectual at one end and intellectual at the other. Where you place a president depends upon whether the president finds intellectuals useful in governing and whether the president actually embraces intellectuals publicly. She argues that most modern presidents have gravitated toward the anti-intellectual position, and out of all these presidents, more Republicans have come to embrace this attitude (although she does not tell us what time period she is investigating, just that "as the presidency has developed over time." She does state that in the "post-New Deal period," there has not been an explicitly "pro-intellectual" president.
To highlight her argument, she uses mini-case studies, selecting three Republican presidents--Eisenhower, Reagan, and Bush 43. Why these three is not clear. Why, for instance, not Johnson or Carter? Why not Nixon, whose administration disdained intellectuals (nattering nabobs)?
She describes the anti-intellectual underpinning of these three administrations came from their "attitude about intellectual life and their public posturing." Further, anti-intellectualism is a "strategic tool used by [these three] to enhance their political authority. (296)" She also claims that the tendency of modern presidencies to "go alone" in governing--rather than working with the Congress or the courts, is hallmark anti-intellectual--that is, anti-intellectuals are confident in their way as right without the need for deliberation with outsiders. She then examines each case by looking at public comments, biographies, and interviews with those close to the president to demonstrate how each was decidedly anti-intellectual. She concludes that "George W. Bush is perhaps the most skilled operator of anti-intellectualism (301)" because of his success as disarming his opposition by forcing his those critics to grossly underestimate his abilities. Either way, this trend (which has accelerated with the plebiscitary nature of the modern presidency) isn't a good thing: "The political benefit of anti-intellectualism is the pseudo-egalitarian connections it forges between presidents and the public. The danger is that the political importance of this supposed populist connection has supplanted the more intricate, policy-oriented debate that should serve as the hallmark of deliberation in an extended democratic republic. (301)"
I had a number of problems with the piece, and I will list them as follows, with some discussion.
First, throwing in the unilateralism as a sign of anti-intellectualism was probably the comment of one of the anonymous reviewers, or it just seemed an easy explanation for the trend of presidents since Nixon to take a unilateral approach to governing. But unilateralism is not something that a single president brought to the presidency, but rather is something forced upon recent presidents by external circumstances. A vigorous Congress (or a "resurgent Congress" as described by some scholars) that was more interested in boxing in an "imperial presidency" made working with Congress to pass his agenda impossible. We may forget that most recent presidents did not have such an easy time dealing with Congress as the current President had during his first six years in office. To compound, a hostile media and cynical public made the kind of governing that she envisions impossible--for Republicans and Democrats alike. Thus her suggestion that unilateralism is asymptomatic to the individual president belies the reality that unilateralism has become institutionalized despite the president. Given that we judge our presidents as successes or failures in their first 100 days in office, there is no other choice for the president but a strategy of going solo.
Second, and I think the more significant, is the fact that this approach to governing is more a response to the critical external environment rather than deeply held beliefs of the occupant. Why did Bush 43 openly embrace the fact that he was a C student, or that he doesn't read newspapers and relies upon the news from his advisers? Because they are disarming to the opposition. Tell everyone you are an underachiever and they will underestimate your ability to succeed. Thus Bush won his debates with Al Gore simply because a win for him was just showing up, where he bar for Gore had been set impossibly high. Thus again this has more to do with how the officeholder plots his path to success. Thus it may be incorrect to claim you are from humble backgrounds, that you understand the needs of the common person, and then brag that you were also a Rhodes Scholar or hold weekend long "get togethers" with the leading minds in politics, the arts, culture, economics, etc., as Clinton did when he ran for office his first term. This only invites the opposition (and particularly the press) to write stories that you are a phony, or a sell-out, or both. In fact, she admits herself that the reasons these presidents adopt this strategy is become it works, not because it is an important part of their genetic wiring. For instance, she notes that "Reagan liked playing the underdog, and understood the value of being underestimated in politics. (299)" It just seems to me that this is part of politics, and as long as it works, why stop?
Which brings me to my third and final point--why does this work? I think there are a couple of things that answer this question, though the question itself was not addressed in her essay. First, I think part of the answer is cultural. How often do we hear the phrase, or some form of it, that there is a difference between book smarts and street smarts, and in most cases, the latter is to be preferred. Why is it that our universities are referred to as ivory towers? There is a profound belief among many Americans that intellectuals are divorced from reality (and that they wear black rimmed glasses with white tape holding the two halves together). Thus it is only natural that politicians tap into that element in order to win elections. Second, the press allows these politicians to get by with it. For instance, the portrayal of Bush 43 as folksy and cattle rancher first and foremost is divorced from reality. The Crawford Ranch, dubbed the "Western White House" only came into the hands of President Bush months before he ran for the presidency. Furthermore, the press allowed creative license with reality because they were charmed by the man. Furthermore, the press is hobbled by their sensitivity to the bias claim. If they take these Republicans to task for portraying themselves differently from how they really are, then they are engaging in liberal bias. Best to leave well enough alone. Leave it to the people. They will sort it out!
So in sum, I simply reject the whole premise of the essay. I don't think creating a connection with the "common man" is especially new, but if it is, I am not sure why it is a Republican trait. I don't recall LBJ sitting with legs crossed, meditating on the problems of the day. In fact, it was "Jimmy" Carter who gave us the People's Presidency. And I think the choice of the cases was designed to make square pegs fit round holes.
The article, "Anti-Intellectualism in the Modern Presidency: A Republican Populism,(read the abstract here)" and written by Colleen J. Shogan, makes the argument that some recent Republican Presidents--emblematic of the modern Republican Party--have embraced anti-intellectualism as a governing strategy. And because these Presidents come to office with limited curiosity and a predisposition to distrust intellectuals, there may be profound consequences for all of us living under a Republican administration. In fact, this article made me squeamish because it is the sort of thing that gives Howlers like David Horowitz ammunition that academia is lined up against conservatives and Republicans.
Anti-intellectualism is defined as "the attainment of knowledge through instincts, character, moral sensibilities, and emotions (295)" and someone whose approach to life is anti-intellectual "disparages the rational complexity associated with intellectual pursuits,...[as well as exhibiting a] distaste for the smugness and superiority they believe accompanies intellectual life. (295-96)" She places her presidents on a continuum with anti-intellectual at one end and intellectual at the other. Where you place a president depends upon whether the president finds intellectuals useful in governing and whether the president actually embraces intellectuals publicly. She argues that most modern presidents have gravitated toward the anti-intellectual position, and out of all these presidents, more Republicans have come to embrace this attitude (although she does not tell us what time period she is investigating, just that "as the presidency has developed over time." She does state that in the "post-New Deal period," there has not been an explicitly "pro-intellectual" president.
To highlight her argument, she uses mini-case studies, selecting three Republican presidents--Eisenhower, Reagan, and Bush 43. Why these three is not clear. Why, for instance, not Johnson or Carter? Why not Nixon, whose administration disdained intellectuals (nattering nabobs)?
She describes the anti-intellectual underpinning of these three administrations came from their "attitude about intellectual life and their public posturing." Further, anti-intellectualism is a "strategic tool used by [these three] to enhance their political authority. (296)" She also claims that the tendency of modern presidencies to "go alone" in governing--rather than working with the Congress or the courts, is hallmark anti-intellectual--that is, anti-intellectuals are confident in their way as right without the need for deliberation with outsiders. She then examines each case by looking at public comments, biographies, and interviews with those close to the president to demonstrate how each was decidedly anti-intellectual. She concludes that "George W. Bush is perhaps the most skilled operator of anti-intellectualism (301)" because of his success as disarming his opposition by forcing his those critics to grossly underestimate his abilities. Either way, this trend (which has accelerated with the plebiscitary nature of the modern presidency) isn't a good thing: "The political benefit of anti-intellectualism is the pseudo-egalitarian connections it forges between presidents and the public. The danger is that the political importance of this supposed populist connection has supplanted the more intricate, policy-oriented debate that should serve as the hallmark of deliberation in an extended democratic republic. (301)"
I had a number of problems with the piece, and I will list them as follows, with some discussion.
First, throwing in the unilateralism as a sign of anti-intellectualism was probably the comment of one of the anonymous reviewers, or it just seemed an easy explanation for the trend of presidents since Nixon to take a unilateral approach to governing. But unilateralism is not something that a single president brought to the presidency, but rather is something forced upon recent presidents by external circumstances. A vigorous Congress (or a "resurgent Congress" as described by some scholars) that was more interested in boxing in an "imperial presidency" made working with Congress to pass his agenda impossible. We may forget that most recent presidents did not have such an easy time dealing with Congress as the current President had during his first six years in office. To compound, a hostile media and cynical public made the kind of governing that she envisions impossible--for Republicans and Democrats alike. Thus her suggestion that unilateralism is asymptomatic to the individual president belies the reality that unilateralism has become institutionalized despite the president. Given that we judge our presidents as successes or failures in their first 100 days in office, there is no other choice for the president but a strategy of going solo.
Second, and I think the more significant, is the fact that this approach to governing is more a response to the critical external environment rather than deeply held beliefs of the occupant. Why did Bush 43 openly embrace the fact that he was a C student, or that he doesn't read newspapers and relies upon the news from his advisers? Because they are disarming to the opposition. Tell everyone you are an underachiever and they will underestimate your ability to succeed. Thus Bush won his debates with Al Gore simply because a win for him was just showing up, where he bar for Gore had been set impossibly high. Thus again this has more to do with how the officeholder plots his path to success. Thus it may be incorrect to claim you are from humble backgrounds, that you understand the needs of the common person, and then brag that you were also a Rhodes Scholar or hold weekend long "get togethers" with the leading minds in politics, the arts, culture, economics, etc., as Clinton did when he ran for office his first term. This only invites the opposition (and particularly the press) to write stories that you are a phony, or a sell-out, or both. In fact, she admits herself that the reasons these presidents adopt this strategy is become it works, not because it is an important part of their genetic wiring. For instance, she notes that "Reagan liked playing the underdog, and understood the value of being underestimated in politics. (299)" It just seems to me that this is part of politics, and as long as it works, why stop?
Which brings me to my third and final point--why does this work? I think there are a couple of things that answer this question, though the question itself was not addressed in her essay. First, I think part of the answer is cultural. How often do we hear the phrase, or some form of it, that there is a difference between book smarts and street smarts, and in most cases, the latter is to be preferred. Why is it that our universities are referred to as ivory towers? There is a profound belief among many Americans that intellectuals are divorced from reality (and that they wear black rimmed glasses with white tape holding the two halves together). Thus it is only natural that politicians tap into that element in order to win elections. Second, the press allows these politicians to get by with it. For instance, the portrayal of Bush 43 as folksy and cattle rancher first and foremost is divorced from reality. The Crawford Ranch, dubbed the "Western White House" only came into the hands of President Bush months before he ran for the presidency. Furthermore, the press allowed creative license with reality because they were charmed by the man. Furthermore, the press is hobbled by their sensitivity to the bias claim. If they take these Republicans to task for portraying themselves differently from how they really are, then they are engaging in liberal bias. Best to leave well enough alone. Leave it to the people. They will sort it out!
So in sum, I simply reject the whole premise of the essay. I don't think creating a connection with the "common man" is especially new, but if it is, I am not sure why it is a Republican trait. I don't recall LBJ sitting with legs crossed, meditating on the problems of the day. In fact, it was "Jimmy" Carter who gave us the People's Presidency. And I think the choice of the cases was designed to make square pegs fit round holes.
Monday, June 11, 2007
Lawyering UP
"National Journal's" Alexis Simendinger has an article (sub. req.) on the change in White House Counsel in the Bush administration. Coming in--well, already in--is old hand Fred Fielding, who served in the Nixon and the Reagan White House, as well as served on the transition teams for both Bush administrations. Why is Fielding brought on board? To guide the Bush administration through the tricky waters of divided government, but more importantly, insure and protect presidential prerogatives:
We have our constitutional prerogatives, which it is my responsibility to help protect. [The Congress] has their constitutional prerogatives as well, and I want to find a middle ground, if we can.
Fielding was brought on board specifically to help the administration work with an opposition Congress since it is clear that the approach of the first term--my way or the highway--would leave President Bush with Zero gains in terms of a legacy once he leaves office (as if anything in the second term will define his legacy). And he has his work cut out for him.
Currently, there is a no-confidence vote before the Senate over Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt the Bush administration's strategy in the War on Terror another blow, deciding that the administration may not hold indefinitely a resident of the United States. This is a striking opinion given where it occurred--not the "liberal" Ninth Circuit, but the "very conservative" Fourth Circuit. I highly recommend reading the opinion for yourself (.pdf required).
And finally subpoenas are up over any time in the last six years. The Bush administration is up against something that it hasn't yet experienced--an energized Congress that is doggedly pursuing information about what the Executive Branch is doing. While Bush has complained that it is all politics--which it certainly is--it is also Congress behaving the way it was intended to behave. In fact, if Bush wishes to make a plausible advance of the unitary executive, then he desperately needs a Congress that is zealous in its oversight of his policies.
We have our constitutional prerogatives, which it is my responsibility to help protect. [The Congress] has their constitutional prerogatives as well, and I want to find a middle ground, if we can.
Fielding was brought on board specifically to help the administration work with an opposition Congress since it is clear that the approach of the first term--my way or the highway--would leave President Bush with Zero gains in terms of a legacy once he leaves office (as if anything in the second term will define his legacy). And he has his work cut out for him.
Currently, there is a no-confidence vote before the Senate over Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt the Bush administration's strategy in the War on Terror another blow, deciding that the administration may not hold indefinitely a resident of the United States. This is a striking opinion given where it occurred--not the "liberal" Ninth Circuit, but the "very conservative" Fourth Circuit. I highly recommend reading the opinion for yourself (.pdf required).
And finally subpoenas are up over any time in the last six years. The Bush administration is up against something that it hasn't yet experienced--an energized Congress that is doggedly pursuing information about what the Executive Branch is doing. While Bush has complained that it is all politics--which it certainly is--it is also Congress behaving the way it was intended to behave. In fact, if Bush wishes to make a plausible advance of the unitary executive, then he desperately needs a Congress that is zealous in its oversight of his policies.
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