So suggests the "National Journal," in an article today on the signing statement (sub. req.). The title reads: OBAMA FOLLOWS SUIT ON SIGNING STATEMENTS: THE PRESIDENT DRAWS FIRE FOR CONTINUING BUSH PRACTICE, BUT IT MAY NOT MEAN MUCH. There you have it.
Quoted in the article is Lou Fisher, Gene Healy of CATO, Eric Posner (a defender of Bush signing statements (.pdf)), Bruce Fein and Neil Kinkopf, OLC attorney for Bill Clinton and critic of Bush signing statements.
The thrust of the article is to figure out the meaning behind Obama's signing statement--first, did he break a campaign pledge and second, is he behaving like President Bush?
The writer, Dan Friedman, repeats the false claim that Obama's March 11 signing of the Omnibus spending bill is his "first signing statement." As I discussed in this post, it was the first time Obama issued a "constitutional" signing statement.
After he provides the background to the controversy, including Obama's memorandum explaining how the signing statement would be used, he gets to the experts. First up is Posner, who says that "signing statements have almost zero practical effect." Pointing to the GAO studies in 2006 and 2007, they found that signing statements have no influence over judges and in an examination of Bush's signing statement to approprations bills, and that in at least nine cases, the law was not executed as intended--but the GAO could not conclude that it was the signing statement that was the cause.
The author also underscores the minimal effects of the signing statement by pointing to a Bush signing statement in January 2008 that challenged, for instance, the creation of a "wartime contracting commission" that had members appointed by someone other than the president. As he notes, despite the challenge in the signing statement, the White House "quietly appointed the commission's members" and complied with the law as written. But it wasn't that simple, and the signing statement actually was an important catalyst. As I wrote here, the White House only allowed the Commission to go forward after it had met with congressional leaders to work out the specifics on what the Commission would do. Thus the challenge served as the impetus to further negotiations, bringing the Congress closer to the White House's position on the bill.
Thus what we should take from this article? The thrust is the signing statement really doesn't have that much effect on the execution of the law, but what effect it does have--at least when Obama uses it--should in no way be taken as a sign that the Bush administration's interpretation of power has returned. If they do not mean anything, then we should no longer concern ourselves with studying them. And if they are meaningful, then it should not matter that Obama is different from Bush.
Either way, this particular article is a muddy mess.
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Saturday, March 28, 2009
Saturday, February 09, 2008
Distorting the Unitary Executive and Other Stuff
Tim Rutten, a columnist at the "Los Angeles Times" writes today about the unitary executive, the signing statement, and John McCain. In it, he makes a potentially interesting observation all the while distorting the theory.
First, the observation. He uses as a backdrop the hearings this week involving torture and waterboarding as well as President Bush and Lord Vader's visit to CPAC, the annual meeting of the Rabid Right--the very meeting where people wept when a faux conservative announced he would drop out of the running for the presidency and booed when the consistent conservative and life long Republican /presidential nominee took the stage.
Vader used colorful language to put his stamp on the righteousness of this administration.
Rutten argues that the administration, with its actions up to the end, is putting McCain on notice: "...if he wants help in patching things up with the conservative base, he'd better pay deference to an obscure legal theory called the 'unitary executive." This would be an interesting quid pro quo if it were true. The administration, and its allies, coming to McCain, and making a deal with McCain: "You both keep quiet about the bodies buried all over the White House and you agree to take on the refugees from 'Lawyers for Romney' and we will sell you to the base." For McCain to suddenly throw open his arms and embrace the unitary executive and all of its tenets would take a 180 from where he stands now. McCain, for instance, has been the only major contender for the presidency to openly eschew the type of power exercised by contemporary presidents. For instance, back in November 2007, McCain told a Rotary Club that he would "never issue a signing statement" when confronted with a bill that has problematic provisions. So I am not sure if Rutten has learned something or is just making a political guess.
Now the problems. First, I am betting that most people who are average followers of politics can tell you that they have heard of the signing statement. I wonder when we can drop the "obscure" adjective when talking about? Rutten continues to obscure what the unitary executive stands for. He writes:
He can throw all the "most constitutional scholars" he wants. It does not do anything to counter the fact that the unitary executive has become an ingrained practice inside the executive branch. Next, the unitarians--at least true unitarians--do not believe that "the legislative nor the judicial branch can check...executive power." Nothing could be further from the truth. They start from the premise that all the branches of government are vigorously pushing their own power, and a president must be ever vigilant to make sure that the power of the presidency is not diminished. What a president objects to is the mixing of power--creating "hybrid commissions" that mix the legislative and executive powers. That is very much a different thing. It certainly has been the case that the Bush administration has made constitutionally questionable claims about executive power couched in unitarian terms. But the administration getting the theory wrong is the fault of the administration--not the theory or those who are proponents thereof.
Later, Rutten says this about the signing statement:
And he says this:
To the first. Bush has made many more challenges than 800. My guess is that Rutten bookmarked this October 2006 article by Charlie Savage that lists Bush's challenges at 800. Wouldn't you think to check and see if Bush has made any more challenges? I don't fault Rutten entirely since many reporters and members of Congress continue to use outdated figures. Next, he makes a big deal that nearly "200 instances" have seen the use of the "unitary executive" to justify the statement. OK, but what do we make of Bush's most recent signing statement where he said this:
Not one mention of the "unitary executive," yet this would be the perfect place for it. Why has he dropped it? What does it mean that it is not referenced? The unitary executive theory does not apply in this case?
In the second highlighted passage, Rutten refers to the DTA of 2005, which gave the signing statement and the unitary executive theory a lot of play. Bush backs away from his stance on torture after McCain refuses to stand down, and then he issues a signing statement that takes back what he said. Given the amount of attention this received, did Bush go ahead and green light torture in the years 2006 and 2007? Don't think so. So should we continue to give mileage to a statement without action? Can't we say the system worked? Bush took a stand and was smacked down by the Congress, the press, and the public. This should be treated as a highpoint for our constitutional system and not as the end of it.
I have written Rutten with my concerns and questions. If he responds, I will let you know.
First, the observation. He uses as a backdrop the hearings this week involving torture and waterboarding as well as President Bush and Lord Vader's visit to CPAC, the annual meeting of the Rabid Right--the very meeting where people wept when a faux conservative announced he would drop out of the running for the presidency and booed when the consistent conservative and life long Republican /presidential nominee took the stage.
Vader used colorful language to put his stamp on the righteousness of this administration.
Rutten argues that the administration, with its actions up to the end, is putting McCain on notice: "...if he wants help in patching things up with the conservative base, he'd better pay deference to an obscure legal theory called the 'unitary executive." This would be an interesting quid pro quo if it were true. The administration, and its allies, coming to McCain, and making a deal with McCain: "You both keep quiet about the bodies buried all over the White House and you agree to take on the refugees from 'Lawyers for Romney' and we will sell you to the base." For McCain to suddenly throw open his arms and embrace the unitary executive and all of its tenets would take a 180 from where he stands now. McCain, for instance, has been the only major contender for the presidency to openly eschew the type of power exercised by contemporary presidents. For instance, back in November 2007, McCain told a Rotary Club that he would "never issue a signing statement" when confronted with a bill that has problematic provisions. So I am not sure if Rutten has learned something or is just making a political guess.
Now the problems. First, I am betting that most people who are average followers of politics can tell you that they have heard of the signing statement. I wonder when we can drop the "obscure" adjective when talking about? Rutten continues to obscure what the unitary executive stands for. He writes:
Whether they're liberals or conservatives, most constitutional scholars don't think the unitary executive notion holds historical or legal water. Essentially, it proposes that the Constitution invests sole executive authority in the president and, therefore, neither the legislative nor the judicial branch can check his exercise of executive power, particularly when it comes to his activities as commander in chief.
He can throw all the "most constitutional scholars" he wants. It does not do anything to counter the fact that the unitary executive has become an ingrained practice inside the executive branch. Next, the unitarians--at least true unitarians--do not believe that "the legislative nor the judicial branch can check...executive power." Nothing could be further from the truth. They start from the premise that all the branches of government are vigorously pushing their own power, and a president must be ever vigilant to make sure that the power of the presidency is not diminished. What a president objects to is the mixing of power--creating "hybrid commissions" that mix the legislative and executive powers. That is very much a different thing. It certainly has been the case that the Bush administration has made constitutionally questionable claims about executive power couched in unitarian terms. But the administration getting the theory wrong is the fault of the administration--not the theory or those who are proponents thereof.
Later, Rutten says this about the signing statement:
Since taking office, Bush has made extraordinary use of the executive "signing statement." This allows a president to sign a bill but to attach a statement saying -- essentially -- that he intends to enforce it in a particular way. Bush has attached about 800 of these statements to legislation he has signed, and, in close to 200 instances, he has explicitly indicated that he intends to enforce a new law only insofar as it does not conflict with the unitary executive theory.
And he says this:
One of those signing statements was attached to McCain's Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which passed the Senate 90 to 9 and explicitly outlawed waterboarding. Bush signed it, but he wrote that it would be enforced "in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief."
To the first. Bush has made many more challenges than 800. My guess is that Rutten bookmarked this October 2006 article by Charlie Savage that lists Bush's challenges at 800. Wouldn't you think to check and see if Bush has made any more challenges? I don't fault Rutten entirely since many reporters and members of Congress continue to use outdated figures. Next, he makes a big deal that nearly "200 instances" have seen the use of the "unitary executive" to justify the statement. OK, but what do we make of Bush's most recent signing statement where he said this:
Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222, purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the President's ability to carry out his constitutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to protect national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.
Not one mention of the "unitary executive," yet this would be the perfect place for it. Why has he dropped it? What does it mean that it is not referenced? The unitary executive theory does not apply in this case?
In the second highlighted passage, Rutten refers to the DTA of 2005, which gave the signing statement and the unitary executive theory a lot of play. Bush backs away from his stance on torture after McCain refuses to stand down, and then he issues a signing statement that takes back what he said. Given the amount of attention this received, did Bush go ahead and green light torture in the years 2006 and 2007? Don't think so. So should we continue to give mileage to a statement without action? Can't we say the system worked? Bush took a stand and was smacked down by the Congress, the press, and the public. This should be treated as a highpoint for our constitutional system and not as the end of it.
I have written Rutten with my concerns and questions. If he responds, I will let you know.
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Confoundment!
President Bush issued the 158th signing statement on Monday (28th) on the down lo (or what other commentators describe as "quietly" issued the statement). He seemed to have issued it when everyone else was focusing on his final State of the Union Address. I have to admit myself that I look at his activities every day and I did not catch it until today when the New York Times issued an editorial challenging Bush's use of the device. The Times notes that "Mr. Bush has issued hundreds of these insidious documents declaring that he had no intention of obeying a law that he had just signed." Actually what Bush has issued "hundreds" of is challenges contained within the signing statement document. To be precise, by my record, the four challenges that came in this signing statement bring the total number of challenges to 1,167--a record to be sure. And for my money, this statement continues to show timidity in the face of a Congress controlled by the opposition. Here is the substance of the signing statement:
The best we can say is that he challenged at least four provisions since he lists them. However, that sentence begins: "Provisions of the Act" and then includes the four provisions. It could very well mean that he has much more in mind, but is holding that close to his vest.
So, the sections themselves:
Section 841 creates a "Commission on Wartime Contracting" whose eight members are appointed by the House, the Senate, and the President, and requires that the Committee investigate private companies, such as Blackwater, who have contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This section gives the Commission the authority to obtain information from executive branch entities such as the Department of Defense, ordering that the "head of such department or agency shall furnish such information expeditiously to the Commission." You can imagine how the term "expeditiously" went over with such scrutinizers as David Addington.
It is my guess that President Bush's objections here involve the "supervision" of the executive branch, given that a Commission is formed with "hybrid" functions. This has long been a gripe of presidents--Commissions that allow appointments from other people than the president, who has the appointment power. In a 1989 OLC Opinion, William Barr, serving as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel, outlined "ten types of legislative encroachments into the prerogatives of the president." Number 1 was "Interference with the appointment power," where "Congress...seeks inroads into the president's prerogative of the appointment. Congress will set up commissions and give the commissioners executive power. The president must diligently use the signing statement to note that his appointees serve in an advisory or ceremonial fashion. Number 2--the creation of "Hybrid Commission" which involves "Congress creating commissions that contain members of the legislative and the executive branch, and often the numbers are tilted in favor of the Congress. (Barr, William P. "Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Constitutional Authority." 13 Op. O.L.C. 299, July 27, 1989.)" In the case of the Wartime Commission, Congress gets six appointees and the president gets two.
Section 846--The section, titled "Protections for Contractor Employees from Reprisal for Disclosure of Certain Information" gives protections to whistleblowers who come forward to:
The administration has been consistent in battling provisions that encourage people to come forward and blow the whistle. In my paper, Rethinking Presidential Power: The Unitary Executive and the Bush Administration, I document the effort the administration made to destroy the whistleblower protection in the Sarbanes-Oxley law.
Section 1079--This section requires any executive branch intelligence organization to turn over "any existing intelligence assessment, report, estimate, or legal opinion" requested by or relating to the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate. If the president does not wish to comply, this section mandates that "White House Counsel shall submit to Congress" the president's assertion of executive privilege, which would stipulate the reasons why the president wishes to protect information.
Section 1222--This final section challenged in President Bush's signing statement has drawn the most attention. This section, by far the shortest, is titled "Limitation on Availability of Funds for Certain Purposes Relating to Iraq." It has two statements: First, there is no funds that can go to establish any "military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq" and the second demands no funding "to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq."
As Elana Schor at the "Guardian" notes, this particular challenge may become "as controversial as the (2005) signing statement sidestepping the torture ban." This particular section is part of an on-going debate between the Bush administration and the Democratic Congress on US presence in Iraq for the long term. In particular, the controversy is grounded in whether this agreement is a treaty or not. Last fall, the administration embarked on an agreement with the al-Maliki government in Iraq to protect the long-term interests (the "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship.") The Senate argues that this agreement should take the form of a treaty, which the Senate would get a say over the terms and in the end, whether it would be ratified. Yet the use of an executive agreement, which has been apart of Republic since birth and what Bush is attempting to do, has allowed the president to get around the treaty process by making agreements with foreign governments that work the same as a treaty, yet without the need to have the Senate ratify. It seems clear that President Bush's challenge of the provisions under the "Commander in Chief" authority cited in the signing statement.
There are some great things that have emerged as a result of the use of the signing statement. The greatest maybe the rapid response by the Congress. Several members spoke out against Bush's challenges on the floor of the chamber, and not just a flip statement in response to a reporters question (see here and here for examples).
I found it interesting that in President Bush's challenge, he claimed that the Congress violated his prerogative to "supervise the executive branch." This is a back down from previous challenges which claimed the prerogative to "supervise the unitary executive branch." That was a meaningful declaration of presidential power, and it seems to have disappeared.
Despite some of the over the top criticisms and other "analysis" of this signing statement, it is clear that the hubris from previous years is gone. The use of the signing statement, coupled with the challenges, are not there.
Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222, purport to impose requirements that could inhibit the President's ability to carry out his constitutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to protect national security, to supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as Commander in Chief. The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.
The best we can say is that he challenged at least four provisions since he lists them. However, that sentence begins: "Provisions of the Act" and then includes the four provisions. It could very well mean that he has much more in mind, but is holding that close to his vest.
So, the sections themselves:
Section 841 creates a "Commission on Wartime Contracting" whose eight members are appointed by the House, the Senate, and the President, and requires that the Committee investigate private companies, such as Blackwater, who have contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This section gives the Commission the authority to obtain information from executive branch entities such as the Department of Defense, ordering that the "head of such department or agency shall furnish such information expeditiously to the Commission." You can imagine how the term "expeditiously" went over with such scrutinizers as David Addington.
It is my guess that President Bush's objections here involve the "supervision" of the executive branch, given that a Commission is formed with "hybrid" functions. This has long been a gripe of presidents--Commissions that allow appointments from other people than the president, who has the appointment power. In a 1989 OLC Opinion, William Barr, serving as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel, outlined "ten types of legislative encroachments into the prerogatives of the president." Number 1 was "Interference with the appointment power," where "Congress...seeks inroads into the president's prerogative of the appointment. Congress will set up commissions and give the commissioners executive power. The president must diligently use the signing statement to note that his appointees serve in an advisory or ceremonial fashion. Number 2--the creation of "Hybrid Commission" which involves "Congress creating commissions that contain members of the legislative and the executive branch, and often the numbers are tilted in favor of the Congress. (Barr, William P. "Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Constitutional Authority." 13 Op. O.L.C. 299, July 27, 1989.)" In the case of the Wartime Commission, Congress gets six appointees and the president gets two.
Section 846--The section, titled "Protections for Contractor Employees from Reprisal for Disclosure of Certain Information" gives protections to whistleblowers who come forward to:
- A Member of Congress
- A representative of a committee of Congress
- An Inspector General
- A GAO officer
- A DOD employee responsible for contract oversight or management
The administration has been consistent in battling provisions that encourage people to come forward and blow the whistle. In my paper, Rethinking Presidential Power: The Unitary Executive and the Bush Administration, I document the effort the administration made to destroy the whistleblower protection in the Sarbanes-Oxley law.
Section 1079--This section requires any executive branch intelligence organization to turn over "any existing intelligence assessment, report, estimate, or legal opinion" requested by or relating to the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate. If the president does not wish to comply, this section mandates that "White House Counsel shall submit to Congress" the president's assertion of executive privilege, which would stipulate the reasons why the president wishes to protect information.
Section 1222--This final section challenged in President Bush's signing statement has drawn the most attention. This section, by far the shortest, is titled "Limitation on Availability of Funds for Certain Purposes Relating to Iraq." It has two statements: First, there is no funds that can go to establish any "military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq" and the second demands no funding "to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq."
As Elana Schor at the "Guardian" notes, this particular challenge may become "as controversial as the (2005) signing statement sidestepping the torture ban." This particular section is part of an on-going debate between the Bush administration and the Democratic Congress on US presence in Iraq for the long term. In particular, the controversy is grounded in whether this agreement is a treaty or not. Last fall, the administration embarked on an agreement with the al-Maliki government in Iraq to protect the long-term interests (the "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship.") The Senate argues that this agreement should take the form of a treaty, which the Senate would get a say over the terms and in the end, whether it would be ratified. Yet the use of an executive agreement, which has been apart of Republic since birth and what Bush is attempting to do, has allowed the president to get around the treaty process by making agreements with foreign governments that work the same as a treaty, yet without the need to have the Senate ratify. It seems clear that President Bush's challenge of the provisions under the "Commander in Chief" authority cited in the signing statement.
There are some great things that have emerged as a result of the use of the signing statement. The greatest maybe the rapid response by the Congress. Several members spoke out against Bush's challenges on the floor of the chamber, and not just a flip statement in response to a reporters question (see here and here for examples).
I found it interesting that in President Bush's challenge, he claimed that the Congress violated his prerogative to "supervise the executive branch." This is a back down from previous challenges which claimed the prerogative to "supervise the unitary executive branch." That was a meaningful declaration of presidential power, and it seems to have disappeared.
Despite some of the over the top criticisms and other "analysis" of this signing statement, it is clear that the hubris from previous years is gone. The use of the signing statement, coupled with the challenges, are not there.
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