David Cole has a review of former Bush Justice Department official Jack Goldsmith's book, The Terror Presidency. Cole, like the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee before him, seems most unhappy with Goldsmith for not unloading on his former boss.
Last month, the Senate Judiciary Committee called Goldsmith to testify about his time in the Bush Justice Department, and it is clear that they had not read his book prior to doing so. When Goldsmith praised the administration, and supported the notion that much of the problems facing the modern presidency has its origins in the Congress, for passing laws in the 1970s that interfered with prerogatives of the president.
For Cole, he titles his piece "The Man Behind the Torture," which refers to VP Cheney's Chief of Staff, David Addington. Goldsmith does spend time criticizing Addington, as does Cole, who makes him out to be a boogeyman, but the criticism is done disingenuously. What do I mean? Back in the 1970s and 1980s, it was popular for those running for national office to run against the bureaucracy. All sorts of horrors could be--and were--heaped upon the back of bureaucrats because the bureaucracy wouldn't fight back. It is the same as cursing the moon for personal problems. Blame is placed elsewhere with no chance of bouncing back.
It is well known that Addington does not do interviews. He is perfectly content to lounge in his spider hole and make his presence felt elsewhere, away from the prying eyes of the media, the Congress, and the American public. Thus for critics, it is easy to place all sorts of blame at his feet. For Goldsmith, blaming Addington makes it easier than placing blame where it is deserved--at the feet of the president.
There are additional problems I have with Cole's critique of the book. Cole chastises Goldsmith for not criticizing administration policy on its merits, instead seeking the diplomatic route by obtaining "congressional authorization for them." I am not sure that it is the job of the political appointees in the Justice Department to criticize the policy on the merits--in particular, to criticize the President for a decision that is his and his alone. What is an appropriate part of the job at Justice is to decide whether the policy is constitutional or consistent with the law. If it is not consistent with the law, then it is perfectly appropriate to recommend that the administration work with Congress--rather than to stand alone--to bolster the case for action. As a critic of the administration, Cole believes that actions he feels is politically repugnant should also be voiced by the officials inside the Justice Department. I don't think that is fair.
Finally, I think in one part, Cole misses the point. He writes: "For all its strengths as a descriptive account of an administration run amok, the prescriptive elements of The Terror Presidency are at best conventional and at worst perverse. Holding up Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a model, Goldsmith recommends that the executive branch should take a more diplomatic approach to the other branches of government. As a matter of realpolitik, he suggests, the executive might well consolidate and exercise its power more effectively by working with Congress and the courts than by aggressively asserting immunity from legislative and judicial oversight on national security matters. What is striking is not the content of this prescription, which in itself is neither novel nor controversial, but the fact that Addington and other members of the Bush administration so vehemently rejected it."
That is not what Goldsmith was saying. Goldsmith argued, quite correctly, that the administration--in particularly Cheney and Addington--resisted any action that involved the Congress for fear that it would be interpreted as precedent for congressional meddling. And that of course is absolutely correct. If Cheney and Addington could put down their blinders for one minute, and recognize that the Congress of 2001-2006 was willing to do whatever the president wished, it could have enhanced the powers of the presidency far greater than the unilateral strategy they chose. And that is right on the button.
